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Definition. A Conviction Review Unit (CRU), sometimes called a Conviction Integrity Unit, conducts extrajudicial,
fact-based review of secured convictions to investigate plausible allegations of actual innocence. A CRU is typically
contained within a local prosecutor’s office.
Best Practices. A CRU dedicated to collaborative, good-faith case reviews designed to ensure the factual integrity of a
conviction should be independent, flexible, and transparent in its work.

INDEPENDENCE
An independent CRU should:
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1.

Report directly to the District Attorney (DA) or prosecuting attorney, or head of the prosecutor’s office, and
should not be contained within the Office’s appellate or post-conviction/habeas unit.

2.

Be led by an attorney with firsthand prosecutorial and criminal defense experience, who is widely respected by
attorneys within the DA’s Office and throughout the jurisdiction’s criminal justice community.

3.

Guard against cognitive or confirmatory biases by including the perspective of at least one external criminal
defense attorney in the process of CRU policy definition, case screening, case investigation, and recommendations
for action.

4.

Be appropriately resourced by attorneys, investigators and staff for whom CRU cases have clear priority above
other office matters, with sufficient personnel and budget resources to enable timely investigations and thorough
and thoughtful recommendations.

5.

Train CRU personnel on specific topics including:
a.

Errors in criminal justice known to be factors in inaccurate convictions;

b.

“Human factors” and emerging issues in forensic science that may impact past convictions secured by the use
of older scientific methods; and

c.

Specific investigative techniques useful for “cold cases;”

6.

Exclude personnel who participated in an underlying case under review from the CRU’s decision-making
regarding the case, limiting participation in such cases to the provision of historical information; and

7.

Establish a clear written policy on when and how to refer to appropriate authorities any credible allegations of
official misconduct (e.g., prosecutorial or law enforcement) identified in the course of a case review.

FLEXIBILITY
A flexible CRU should:
8.

Accept any and all cases for review that have a plausible or colorable claim of factual innocence for the conviction
obtained;

9.

Provide procedural support for fact-based case reviews, tolling any ongoing appellate litigation during active
CRU review and minimizing barriers to the Petitioner’s collaborative participation in case review process;

10. Review all petitions on their factual merits, and not on non-substantive grounds:
a.

Permit review of petitions in which the Petitioner plead guilty to the charges;

b.

Permit review of petitions where the sentence has been completed;

c.

Evaluate claims based on a current understanding of the totality of the circumstances now known, rather
than what could have been presented or known by defense counsel during the pendency of the original case;

d.

Review cases where due process claims (ineffective assistance of counsel, newly discovered evidence, official
misconduct, etc.) support underlying allegations of innocence, and cases where testimonial evidence is the
sole assertion of innocence; and

11. Allow for resubmission of a petition whenever additional credible evidence is brought to light.

TRANSPARENCY
A Transparent CRU should:
12. Vacate each conviction where there is clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence, or where in the interests
of justice, the CRU no longer believes that the current evidence supports the conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt;
13. Refile charges only in cases where there is substantial evidence of guilt notwithstanding evidence gathered during
the investigation of the petition;
14. Consider time served when deciding whether to refile charges, even in instances where evidence of guilt remains;
15. Communicate in an ongoing and timely fashion to Petitioner or Petitioner’s counsel regarding case review,
including sharing any evidence gathered, and explaining the actions taken and conclusions drawn from the
review;
16. Encourage an open exchange of information and ideas regarding the case review between Petitioner and
CRU, including open file discovery and contemporaneous disclosure of information discovered in the CRU
investigation (other than CRU work product information and information that could endanger third parties);
17. Outline any information withheld from the petitioner during the review and establish a process for third-party
review of such withheld information;
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18. Make all physical evidence available for testing by either party, including re-testing of a previously tested object
if the proposed method of testing can provide additional information;
19. Provide testing of evidence that may provide conclusive evidence of innocence at no cost to Petitioner, and
permit other testing at Petitioner’s cost;
20. Publish clear CRU policies and procedures designed to ensure flexibility of operations and encourage the
submission of petitions for review. Suggested areas for published policies and procedures include:
i.

How to submit a claim

ii.

Types of cases accepted for review

iii. Standards of review for initial case acceptance (screening), case review, and vacating a conviction
iv.

Role of Petitioner/Petitioner’s counsel in case review

v.

Role of original prosecutor/ investigator in case review

vi. Requirements on waiver of attorney/client privilege, or use of a collaboration agreement
vii. Sharing of information learned/evidence discovered during case review
viii. Conduct and payment for requested forensic testing
ix. Procedures for handling allegations of prosecutorial or law enforcement misconduct
x.

Disclosure of final decision after case review and supporting rationale

xi. Ability of Petitioner to revisit process after final decision
19. Engage a victim’s advocate to liaise with victims or their families during the CRU investigation phase, once the
CRU determines that there is a reasonable possibility that the underlying conviction was inaccurate; and
20. Track and report on CRU activity at least annually, including but not limited to: number of petitions received,
number reviewed, number accepted for additional review, reasons for rejecting reviews, number acted upon, types
of issues in cases, final conclusions, etc.

PREVENTION
In addition, a CRU should seek to implement a culture of learning from error within the prosecutor’s office,
suggesting reforms to prevent the recurrence of errors that resulted in an inaccurate conviction. A CRU seeking to
prevent the recurrence of errors should:
21. Conduct a root cause analysis or “Just Culture Event Review,” separate and apart from the CRU case review, on
each case where a recommendation is made to alter a conviction, to understand and address the circumstances
and environments that allowed one or more errors to occur in the administration of justice;
22. Identify improved policies and procedures for each stakeholder that might prevent the recurrence of the error(s)
that permitted the flawed conviction to occur; and
23. Construct a process to implement, publicize and evaluate those modifications throughout the jurisdiction.
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CRU Checklist
As Conviction Review Units have emerged across the
United States, community and other observers have
sought to evaluate their impact and to identify those
CRUs that are sincere about investigating and resolving
credible allegations of factual innocence among closed
convictions. A skepticism prevails that some CRUs are
units conducting “Conviction Review In Name Only,”
or “CRINOs.” This skepticism is fueled by CRUs that
lack the independence, flexibility, and transparency that
is described herein.
There is no single, conclusive measure that reveals
whether a particular unit is a sincere CRU or a callow
CRINO. This is true even of the metric that most casual
observers focus on – the number of exonerated individuals

whose convictions were vacated by the Unit. Accordingly,
observers should not point to any individual “best practice”
recommended in this paper as definitive proof that any
particular CRU is or is not engaged in the good faith
review of cases of error that is at the core of the CRU’s
potential to change criminal justice for the better. In fact,
none of the CRUs we interviewed answered all of these
questions as we suggest below, and in the opinion of the
authors, many (in fact, most) of them are sincere CRUs.
By asking the following questions as a group, however,
we believe that an overall profile of sincere CRUs will
emerge that can distinguish them from CRINOs, or that
will prompt a conversation in offices that have not yet
embraced the precepts of other established CRUs.
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Sincere CRU:
Potential for
Indicator of
Conviction
Independence,
Review In
Flexibility,
Name Only
Transparency		

Does the CRU report to the DA/Head of Office?

Yes

No

Does the CRU exist within the appellate/habeas/post-conviction unit of
the Office?

No

Yes

More

Fewer

How many attorneys are dedicated to the CRU full-time?
•

Is the leader of the CRU a senior attorney widely respected in
the Office?

Yes

No

•

Does the leader of the CRU have defense experience?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Is the CRU sufficiently funded to thoroughly review and investigate all
credible petitions within a reasonable period of time?

Faster

Slower

Does the Office provide training to personnel conducting CRU case
reviews?

Yes

No

Does the CRU provide training to personnel concerning learnings from
case reviews?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Does the CRU permit individuals who participated in the underlying case
to participate in CRU case reviews?

No

Yes

Does the CRU provide any new evidence gathered during a case review
to Petitioner in a timely fashion?

Yes

No

Does the CRU have a policy on when and how to report exculpatory
information gathered during a case review?

Yes

No

Does the CRU include external participants
•

In policy creation?

•

In case selection?

•

In case investigation/review?

•

In recommendations for action?

Does the CRU have its own budget?

Does the CRU have written policies and procedures describing its work?
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•

Are the CRU’s policies and procedures posted on its web site?

•

Are the CRU’s policies and procedures available upon request?

			
			
			
			
			
Does the CRU have a policy on when and how to report credible
allegations of official misconduct, either related to the petition or during
the case review, from law enforcement, the prosecutors’ office, or other
sources?

Sincere CRU:
Potential for
Indicator of
Conviction
Independence,
Review In
Flexibility,
Name Only
Transparency		

Yes

No

No

Yes

Does the CRU make physical evidence available to Petitioner or
Petitioner’s counsel for testing?

Yes

No

Does the CRU voluntarily toll appellate proceedings while conducting
a case review?

Yes

No

Does the CRU permit resubmission of a petition if credible factual
information supporting innocence is found after a prior CRU review?

Yes

No

Does the CRU communicate with the Petitioner or Petitioner’s counsel
throughout the assessment and investigation stages of case review?

Yes

No

Does the CRU allow Petitioner or Petitioner’s counsel to participate
in case investigation?

Yes

No

When making recommendations about a specific petition, does the
CRU evaluate the totality of the circumstances as now understood, rather
than assessing the reasonableness of the Office’s actions at the time of
the underlying case?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Does the CRU reject petitions of actual innocence on the basis of
procedural grounds:
•

Guilty pleas

•

Exhausted appeals

•

Sentence status

•

Due process claims

Does the CRU communicate the rationale for its decisions to Petitioner
or Petitioner’s counsel before that decision is final?
•

Is the rationale provided in writing?

Does the CRU provide annual reporting on its activities and impact?
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Figure 1. Conviction Review Units In The United States, December 2015

9

22
5

12
19

11
6

26

23

Participated in Survey
Special Purpose CRU Participated
Did Not Participate in Survey
Announced Late 2015

1.

10

1

27
20

18
15

16

17

21

2
13

7

14
8

25

3

24

4

North Carolina

10. Baltimore City, MD

20. Los Angeles County, CA

Inn. Inq. Comm.

11. Cook County, IL

21. Washington, DC

2.

Santa Clara County, CA

12. Lake County, IL

22. Multnomah County, OR

3.

Dallas County, TX

13. Ventura County, CA

23. Pima County, AZ

4.

Harris County, TX

14. Suffolk County, MA

24. Bexar County, TX

5.

Wayne County, MI

15. Nassau County, NY

25. Tarrant County, TX

6.

Colorado JRP

16. Philadelphia County, PA

7.

New York County, NY

17. Cuyahoga County, OH

26. San Diego County, CA
(ann. 12/15)*

8.

Kings County, NY

18. Middlesex County, MA

9.

Oneida County, NY

19. Yolo County, CA

27. Clark County, NV
(ann. 12/15)

Offices in PURPLE TEXT were initiated after January 2014.
*The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office formed a “liaison” with the California Innocence Project in March, 2011 to review cases where actual
innocence was alleged; this liaison was announced as a formal Conviction Review Unit in December, 2012.
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Introduction
It should be the bedrock that… you’re trying to do the correct thing, the just thing and not necessarily
doing the thing that just favors your side. This is very contraindicated to people who get into trial
work on both sides, because people who get into trial work are highly competitive people… We’re
not doing this just to correct past mistakes. We’re doing this to try to get something out that can be
a road map [explaining], here is where you did something wrong, and correct it so that there are not
wrongful convictions in the future.
–Conviction Review Unit Lead Prosecutor

Over the past two decades, Americans have grown more
and more aware of the number of individuals across our
country who have been convicted of crimes they did not
commit. As of March 1, 2016, there were 1,747 such
exonerated individuals across the United States.1 While
it is typically defense attorneys or prisoners themselves

who first bring these exoneration cases to light, the fate
of each individual claiming innocence from behind bars
rests (for the most part) with state and local prosecutors
employed in the very offices that secured the individual’s
conviction in the first place.

National Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx. The Registry defines an “exoneration” as follows: A person has
been exonerated if he or she was convicted of a crime and later was either: (1) declared to be factually innocent by a government official or agency with the authority
to make that declaration; or (2) relieved of all the consequences of the criminal conviction by a government official or body with the authority to take that action.
The official action may be: (i) a complete pardon by a governor or other competent authority, whether or not the pardon is designated as based on innocence; (ii) an
acquittal of all charges factually related to the crime for which the person was originally convicted; or (iii) a dismissal of all charges related to the crime for which the
person was originally convicted, by a court or by a prosecutor with the authority to enter that dismissal. The pardon, acquittal, or dismissal must have been the result, at
least in part, of evidence of innocence that either (i) was not presented at the trial at which the person was convicted; or (ii) if the person pled guilty, was not known to
the defendant, the defense attorney and the court at the time the plea was entered. The evidence of innocence need not be an explicit basis for the official action that
exonerated the person.

1
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Mindful that “[t]he prosecutor has more control over
life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in
America,”2 and aware of the ethical duty “to seek
justice, not merely to convict,”3 many prosecutors have
responded to the rise of exonerations by acknowledging
the potential for mistakes in the criminal justice system,
and working to establish an objective process to review
cases where mistakes may have been made regarding guilt
or innocence, taking any and all appropriate actions to
ensure that justice is done, including vacating a previously
secured conviction.
While all prosecutors’ offices have a procedure for
handling appeals, including habeas corpus or postconviction appeals, the most prevalent institutional
response by prosecutors to address fact-based postconviction claims of actual innocence is the Conviction
Review Unit (CRU), sometimes called the Conviction
Integrity Unit.4 Since the first CRU was created in
the mid-2000s,5 more than 25 such units have been
announced across the country. See Figure 1.
The creation of a CRU is a public commitment by the
DA6 to ensure the accuracy, and therefore the legitimacy
– that is, the integrity – of all criminal convictions
secured by the Office. As Los Angeles (CA) County
District Attorney Jackie Lacey said when announcing her
Conviction Review Unit in June, 2015:

Just as we are expected to keep pace
with advances in forensic science,
technology and investigative methods,
prosecutorial agencies also must
update and formalize the way in which
post-conviction claims of innocence
are handled. We must respond
whenever we receive new substantial
and credible information that the
evidence used to imprison someone
for a serious or violent felony is not
trustworthy. We must review that
information and determine if we
remain confident in the conviction. As
prosecutors, we have a legal obligation
and an ethical mandate to ensure that
the right person is convicted for the
crime charged.7

The philosophy of a CRU is straightforward, but
implementing such a unit in a highly charged political
and adversarial environment can be complex and
challenging. Furthermore, each jurisdiction that has
created a CRU has independently defined its structure,
scope, and operations, often in reaction to a limited
number of unique cases. Very few CRUs have written
protocols, policies, or procedures, and what protocols
do exist have rarely been made public. Accordingly, we
sought to conduct a national survey of CRU practices and
their impact.

2

Jackson, Robert H., “The Federal Prosecutor,” Address at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys, Washington, DC, April 1, 1940, p. 1.

3

ABA Model Rule 3.8(a)

Although the first units called themselves “Conviction Integrity Units,” more units over time have come to favor the label “Conviction Review Units.” The word
“Review” is often preferred as a more accurate representation of what the Unit does. In addition, some prosecutors feel that reviewing cases for “integrity” might cause
an inference that “integrity” does not exist in all convictions. Because we use the term “conviction integrity” in this paper to refer to an evaluation of a conviction in a
case where neither guilt nor innocence have been proven to a certainty, we use the term “Conviction Review Unit” throughout.

4
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Two offices, Santa Clara (CA) and Dallas (TX) typically vie for the title of “First CRU.” Santa Clara set up a nascent CRU in 2004, but it took a one-term hiatus
under a new DA before being reinstated in 2008. Craig Watkins became the DA in Dallas County (TX) in 2007 and started the longest continuously operating CRU
at that time; it is the publicity this office garnered that gets most of the credit for leading the wave of CRUs that has followed. It is San Diego, however, that may
properly lay claim to the origination of the concept, when Deputy District Attorney Woody Clark started a “DNA Innocence Project” in his office in 2000 to review
claims of actual innocence that could be resolved through DNA testing.

5

We use the term “District Attorney” and associated abbreviations, etc. herein as a global term for non-federal prosecutors, including jurisdictions where the local
prosecutors are referred to as “State’s Attorney.”

6

There are too few CRUs operating for too short a
time to obtain conclusive assessments of the utility of
different policies or procedures, or to measure the impact
of a CRU on criminal justice outcomes or perceptions.
Still, there is value in an empirical attempt to draw
observational theories or lessons learned by the first wave
of CRUs. Commentary on CRUs has been limited, and
for the most part anecdotal, consisting mainly of media
accounts of the creation of individual CRUs. The concept
of conviction integrity has been discussed with a focus on
prosecutorial “best practices” that could prevent errors,8
while discussions of CRUs have focused on either
their roles in the exoneration of innocent individuals
or theoretical suggestions for their application.9 Given
the rapid increase in the number of CRUs nationwide
(fourteen new CRUs have been announced since the
start of 2014)10 and the lack of standards or evaluations
of policies, procedures, and impact of CRUs, a more
detailed assessment of the actual policies and practices of
operating CRUs may be helpful to a variety of audiences.

To date, CRUs have focused on identifying and
correcting past errors in convictions. Some are beginning
to perceive the additional potential of the CRU to be a
driver of quality improvement, learning from errors to
propose procedural or environmental reforms throughout
a jurisdiction to prevent future errors. But the potential
value of a CRU extends even beyond these important
goals. Sincere CRUs that conduct open and honest
reviews of post-conviction claims of actual innocence
stand as a triumph of truth and justice over procedural
legal formality, and of collaboration over adversarialism,
competitiveness, or bias. As such, they restore faith in our
criminal justice system by practicing the highest ideals
of truth and justice that are often preached, and often
doubted.

This paper seeks to help:
(a) Prosecutors in offices with established CRUs
understand how their peers have approached
common challenges that arise in the fact-based,
extrajudicial review of convictions to ensure
conviction accuracy and integrity;
(b) Prosecutors in offices without CRUs accelerate
the creation of units with maximum positive
impact; and
(c) Communities that have or want CRUs evaluate
such units and ensure that CRUs are living up to
their aspirations for improvement of the criminal
justice system over time.

“Why A Conviction Review Unit is Needed: Jackie Lacey,” Los Angeles Daily News, June 24, 2015, accessed at http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20150625/why-aconviction-review-unit-is-needed-jackie-lacey, last visited September 9, 2015.

7

Barkow et al., Center of the Administration of Criminal Law, New York University School of Law, “Establishing Conviction Integrity Programs in Prosecutors’
Offices.”

8

Gross, Samuel, et al., “The National Registry of Exonerations: Exonerations in 2014,” Published January 27, 2015, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/about.aspx; Scheck, Barry, “Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating
Them,” Cardozo L. Rev. 31:6 (2010), 2216-56.

9

10
The Orleans Parish (LA) District Attorney’s Office announced a CRU in collaboration with the Innocence Project New Orleans in late 2014; the collaboration was
concluded in January, 2016. http://www.theneworleansadvocate.com/news/14502358-64/cannizzaro-innocence-project-call-it-quits-on-project-to-unearth-false-convictions
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Creation of the Conviction
Review Unit
The very creation of a Conviction Review Unit should be
seen as a promising development in the administration
of justice, as it highlights the prosecutorial role in
ensuring the legitimacy of criminal convictions, and the
continuation of that obligation even after a conviction is
secured.
While such an ongoing obligation might seem contrary
to the mission or motives of a District Attorney, the
prosecutors who took part in our research uniformly believe
that investigating cases where errors may have occurred
is not only desirable, but essential. Our requirement that
the criminal justice system function flawlessly does not

ensure its perfection. Errors in criminal justice, as in
any human system, persist despite the best efforts of our
police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and juries.
Each allegation of wrongful conviction undermines the
legitimacy of the prosecutorial role, and an office that
refuses to address such allegations openly and honestly
adds self-inflicted injury to its reputation. While perhaps
such errors cannot be eliminated by the system, its actors
must work to minimize their occurrence and severity. This
can be done most effectively by identifying, evaluating
and learning from every error in a system in a culture of
relentless and objective self-improvement.11

11
See Generally, An Organisation With a Memory: Report of an Expert Group on Learning from Adverse Events in the NHS, Chaired by the Chief Medical Officer (The
Stationery Office 2000), available at https://psnet.ahrq.gov/resources/resource/1568 (a major study undertaken by the National Health Service in the United Kingdom,
exploring the causes of failure or adverse events, drawing on lessons from other industries, proposing a shift in organizational culture from a culture of blame to
open reporting and balanced analysis, and arguing for a systems-centered approach to failure analysis rather than a person-centered approach of “blaming, naming
and shaming”); M. V. Williams, Improving Patient Safety in Radiotherapy by Learning from Near Misses, Incidents and Errors, 80 Brit. J. Radiol. 297 (2007),
available at https://psnet.ahrq.gov/resources/resource/5673/improving-patient-safety-in-radiotherapy-by-learning-from-near-misses-incidents-and-errors (arguing for the
implementation of widespread open reporting of near misses, incidents, and errors, with web archiving of the information on publicly available databases in order
to insure widespread learning); Qing Yan, Michelle C. Bligh & Jeffrey C. Kohles, Absence Makes the Errors Go Longer: How Leaders Inhibit Learning from Errors, 222
Zeitschrift für Psychologie 233 (2014), available at http://econtent.hogrefe.com/doi/abs/10.1027/2151-2604/a000190 (original research study exploring the effects

Conviction
Review
Units:
A National
Perspective
13

The decision to create a CRU may also arise from a more
pragmatic place. Most District Attorneys are elected
officials, politicians as well as prosecutors, and many
jurisdictions that have created CRUs have received positive
coverage in the media for placing accuracy in justice on a
higher pedestal than conviction or case closure rates.12 As
in other industries, errors or misconduct provide powerful
incentives for procedural change. Wrongful convictions,
and the calls for reform they create, are often used by
challengers to a sitting District Attorney, and highprofile cases of error are often held up as proof of a DA’s
lack of competence (if not lack of morals). The creation of
a CRU, then, can help a sitting DA respond to allegations
of error or incompetence, or a new DA follow through
on a campaign promise to improve the Office, each in
furtherance of community relations:
It was one of the things I had
campaigned on, and this issue was a
hot topic during our campaign because
[cases of wrongful conviction] were
getting a lot of media attention. It
was a big issue in terms of wrongful
convictions and what’s the next [chief
prosecutor] going to do to address it.

Such factors led to the creation of the first CRUs. In
Santa Clara, DA George Kennedy was confronted by
a small number of exonerations in sexual assault cases.
Working with Assistant DAs David Angel and Karen
Sununu, Kennedy envisioned a unit within the DA’s
Office that would identify and implement “best practices”
to improve the quality of the Office’s prosecutions, and
ensure the accuracy and legitimacy of its convictions.
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Not long after, in 2006, Craig Watkins became the first
African-American District Attorney of Dallas County,
supported by a voter base separate from, and disenchanted
with, the existing Dallas political establishment. Watkins
campaigned on a platform of reform, bolstered by the
fact that Dallas had had more post-conviction DNA
exonerations (12) in the prior five years than any county in
the nation. When another DNA-based exoneration was
announced shortly after his inauguration, Watkins met
the man at the courthouse and offered a public apology to
the man. Watkins had no role in the exoneration itself and
has since described his act simply as common courtesy.13
The media, however, viewed it as something more, and
the story quickly found its way into the national press.14
Not long after, Watkins was informed of a substantial
number of untested rape kits in the possession of the
Dallas DA’s Office. Taking what he has described as a
common sense approach to the problem, he ordered the
testing of all untested kits.15 The result was an increase
in cases deserving of review, and the combination of
increased cases and public support both within the
electoral base and on a national level led Watkins to
formally create a Conviction Review Unit in 2007 as a
resource to address these and other such cases that might
arise.16 Watkins hired Mike Ware, a law professor at Texas
Wesleyan University School of Law and a board member
of the Innocence Project of Texas, to oversee the unit and
engaged law students to conduct the case screenings to
determine eligibility.17 Importantly, Ware had substantial
experience as a defense attorney, and was also respected
by the attorneys at the DA’s Office for being fair and
trustworthy.18

of five different leadership styles, both positive and negative, on learning from errors); Michael Frese & Nina Keith, Action Errors, Error Management, and Learning
in Organizations, 66 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 661 (2015), available at http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev- (review of research on error prevention
and error management, explaining the difference between the two approaches, and discussing the empirical evidence for the positive effects of error management,
emphasizing the importance for successful learning outcomes of a mindset of acceptance of human error); Suzanne M. Wright, Patient Safety in Anesthesia: Learning
from the Culture of High-Reliability Organizations, 27 Crit. Care Nurs. Clin. N. Am. 1 (2015), available online at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25725532
(“In this article the most current understanding of human factors, complex systems, and safety principles borrowed from high-reliability organizations (HRO) is
provided as a foundation to examine the dynamic and vulnerable nature of anesthesia practice. HROs—industries that deliver reliable performances in the face of
complex working environments—can serve as models of safety for our health care system until plausible explanations for patient harm are better understood.”)
12
See, e.g., Emily, J., “Dallas County conviction integrity unit turns focus to non-DNA cases,” Dallas Morning News, March 24, 2010, accessible at http://www.
dallasnews.com/news/community-news/dallas/headlines/20100522-Dallas-County-conviction-integrity-unit-turns-6750.ece; Barber, E., “Dallas targets wrongful
convictions, and revolution starts to spread,” Christian Science Monitor, May 25, 2014, accessible online at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2014/0525/Dallastargets-wrongful-convictions-and-revolution-starts-to-spread; Meminger, D., “Some DA’s Make Effort to Help People Wrongfully Convicted of Crimes,” Time Warner
NY1 Cable News, July 13, 2015, available online at http://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/criminal-justice/2015/07/13/some-das-make-effort-to-help-people-wrongfullyconvicted-of-crimes.html; Gerber, M., “D.A. creates unit to review claims of innocence,” LA Times, June 29, 2015, available online at http://www.latimes.com/local/
california/la-me-0630-conviction-integrity-20150630-story.html.

Figure 2. Creation of Conviction Review Units Over Time.
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Often the impetus for starting a CRU has been one or
more specific cases in the jurisdiction, covered in the
media and raising concern about the local administration
of justice:19
We had had an exoneration in this
county… I would say it was part of
the genesis of the idea of a conviction
integrity program. I would say it
inspired the idea that we wanted…
procedures to come up with a way of
dealing with it that was a little bit more
formalized.

13
2015 Quattrone Center Spring Symposium, “A Systems Approach to Conviction Integrity,” University of Pennsylvania Law School, April 4, 2014, Presentation of
Craig Watkins.
14

See, e.g., “New Prosecutor Revisits Justice in Dallas,” Sylvia Moreno, Washington Post, March 5, 2007.

15

Watkins, see footnote 13 above.

16

Moore, Terri, “Prosecutors Reinvestigate Questionable Evidence: Dallas Establishes a `Conviction Integrity Unit,’” Criminal Justice, Volume 26, Number 3, Fall 2011

17

“New Prosecutor Revisits Justice in Dallas,” Sylvia Moreno, Washington Post, March 5, 2007.

Scheck, Barry, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models For Creating Them. Cardozo L. Rev. 31:6,
2010, pp. 2215 – 2256, at 2251.
18

19
See, e.g., DC Prosecutors Create Unit to Fine Wrongful Convictions,” Washington Post, September 11, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
crime/dc-prosecutors-create-unit-to-find-wrongful-convictions/2014/09/11/91a3722c-39da-11e4-bdfb-de4104544a37_story.html. The Jesse Friedman case in the Second
Circuit, and the exoneration of Daryl Hunt in North Carolina, provided motivation for the creation of the Nassau County Conviction Review Project and the North
Carolina Innocence Commission, respectively; in addition, the Wayne County (MI) ballistics review was created to review a group of cases with questionable forensic
conclusions.
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Figure 3. Impetus for Conviction Review Unit Formation.
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The factors that led to the creation of CRUs in Dallas and
Santa Clara are not unique to these jurisdictions, and as
public awareness of errors in the administration of justice
has grown, DAs in other jurisdictions have adopted the
CRU model in their jurisdictions, at an accelerating pace
(see Figure 2).
Many DAs, in offices with and without established CRUs,
have noted that reviews of cases where actual innocence
has been alleged have always been a part of a prosecutor’s
job. Still, DAs have seen actual and promotional value in
the creation of a formal unit that is publicly tasked with
conducting such case reviews:
We got a new district attorney who
came in… and started the unit. It
was very much done on the heels of
Dallas. Dallas County’s Conviction
Review Unit was getting quite a lot
of attention, they were doing a lot of
good work out there and there was a
decision to do a separate and distinct
unit in our office. Claims of innocence
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and post-conviction DNA testing
cases had been previously handled
by the post-conviction writs division.
So it’s not that we weren’t doing the
work, but we did not have a standalone
section that had 100% of its time and
resources dedicated to that type of
work.
There are a number of these units
bringing up across the country…
They’re… being publicized. So there
is a ground swell of support for these
kinds of things. But if you dig a little
deeper I think it’s a direct response
and a result of the Innocence Project.
… [Our DA] was interested in it. He’s
been asked to do it by people in and
out of the office… We needed to be
able to have a unit in our office that
would deal with them directly.

Models of Conviction Review
There is a great deal of variety among CRUs in their
structure, funding, participants, procedures, cases eligible
for review, etc. One area of near-unanimous agreement,
however, is the CRU’s overarching purpose. CRUs exist
to conduct fact-based reviews of plausible claims of
actual innocence20 without regard to the type of error or
mindset of the participants involved.
This focus on fact-based case review pushes the CRU into
an extrajudicial role, distanced from post-conviction or
habeas corpus proceedings that expressly avoid assessing
facts and focus on legal and due process concerns.
Without reducing the need for those structures in our
criminal justice system, CRUs seek to avoid decisions
based on legal or procedural grounds, focusing instead on

the injustice that matters most to the typical American
– did the convicted individual actually commit the crime
for which he or she was convicted?
While all CRUs exist for this stated purpose, they have
evolved into several models:
“Standard” CRUs. While no two CRUs are identical,
23 of the units we reviewed share a similar high-level
structure: one or more experienced Assistant District
Attorneys21 are given special responsibility within a
prosecutor’s office to review cases where (a) a conviction
has been achieved; (b) direct appeals have been rejected;
and (c) actual innocence is claimed by the convicted
individual. As we will see, CRUs vary in size and

20
This paper describes the initial communication to a CRU regarding a case for potential review as a “petition,” and describes the individual claiming innocence as
the “Petitioner.” In reality, a “petition” may be a letter from the convicted individual him/herself, or a telephone call to the CRU from the individual, his/her family
member, etc. Our use of “petition” or “Petitioner” should therefore be distinguished from any formal, court-required petition for appellate review.
21
To date, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia is the only federal prosecutor’s office to publicly announce the formation of a CRU. This
may be in part because of the unique caseload of the USAO in Washington, DC, which handles all manner of violent crimes and “blue collar” misdemeanors and
felonies that are more typically handled by state or local officials in non-federal jurisdictions.
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structure, policies and procedures, structural distance
from the post-conviction appellate or habeas processes,
and the extent to which external personnel are engaged as
advisors or reviewers of case-specific information, but this
basic structure describes what we will call the “standard”
Conviction Review Unit.
“Special Project” CRUs. In several instances, prosecutors
have established case review teams as a targeted response
to a specific and identifiable group of cases potentially
subject to the same or similar repeatable errors, typically in
forensic science. The work of these teams has been funded
by specific (federal) grants permitting the deployment of
resources to conduct new DNA or ballistic investigations.
Such “Special Project CRUs” include the Wayne County
(MI) ballistics review project, the Colorado Justice
Review Project, and the St. Louis DNA Review Project.
In Wayne County, for example, laboratory mistakes
in handling gun cases were brought to the attention of
the DA by a defense attorney and a crime lab analyst. A
resulting audit suggested a potential error rate of 10% in
firearms cases, causing the closure of Detroit’s crime lab
in 2008, and the DA’s initiation of a process to review
firearms cases that might have been affected by the errors.
A similar story led to the creation of the state-wide
Colorado Justice Review Project ( JRP), which began as
a joint project of the Colorado Attorney General and the
Denver District Attorney to review convictions of certain
violent crimes in which post-conviction DNA testing
might be used to exonerate an innocent inmate. The
JRP received federal funds in 2010 for this purpose, and
those funds were renewed and extended to other types of
crimes. While the initiative is ongoing, its activities have
been significantly curtailed since the expiration of that
funding in 2013.
Innocence Commissions. An alternative to the
standard CRU is the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry
Commission (NCIIC). Created and funded by the North
Carolina state legislature in 2006 “to investigate and
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evaluate post-conviction claims of factual innocence”
throughout the state,22 the goals of the NCIIC are the
same as the standard CRU, though it acts as a statewide
independent clearing house for the investigation of actual
innocence claims rather than leaving the administration
of actual innocence claims to each local jurisdiction.
This potentially expands the cases eligible for fact-based
conviction review, particularly in jurisdictions that have
fewer than 5 prosecutors. In such jurisdictions, which
account for roughly three-fourths of all prosecutor’s offices
nationwide,23 resource constraints are likely to limit the
ability of the office to create and sustain a formal CRU.
On the other hand, as explored more fully below, the
NCIIC has no structural ties to any prosecutor’s office,
and its investigation into cases may be received less than
enthusiastically from prosecutors in the jurisdictions
where the cases originated. Furthermore, while the
NCIIC has subpoena power to aid in its investigations,
its recommendations themselves lack the power of law.
Instead, the NCIIC presents its findings, along with the
participation of the relevant DA’s Office, in a hearing to a
judge. Thus, the NCIIC is a step removed from traditional
CRUs in its ability to affect change in individual cases,
and it has no authority to implement reforms that might
prevent such errors from reoccurring.
North Carolina’s use of the term “Innocence Commission”
should be differentiated from other states, including New
York, Pennsylvania, California, and most recently Texas,
where legislatures have appointed Innocence Commissions
staffed by criminal justice experts to review issues related
to wrongful convictions and generate recommendations
to minimize their occurrence. These organizations share
the title of “Innocence Commission” with the NCIIC, but
use the term differently. While they may review past cases
of wrongful conviction, only North Carolina’s Innocence
Commission participates in the review of active cases
currently under appeal. The other states using the term
assemble a broad group of stakeholders including

22
North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission website, available at http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/statute.html, downloaded August 17, 2015; North
Carolina G.S. §§ 15A-1460 - 1475.
23

Prosecutors in State Courts, 2007, United States Bureau of Justice Statistics, December 2011.

prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, victims’ advocates,
exonerees, and others, and review confirmed exoneration
cases from the jurisdiction and elsewhere, with the goal
being a set of recommendations for reform intended to
reduce wrongful convictions throughout the state. In
some states (e.g., California, Pennsylvania), the authoring
of the report completes the work of the commission,
while in others (e.g., New York State Justice Task Force),
the group’s agenda and recommendations are ongoing.
Such commissions are engaged in a valuable inquiry, but
their observations are inherently limited by time and
cases reviewed. They miss the opportunity created by the
traditional CRU model to implement an ongoing and
increasingly sophisticated culture of learning from error
that matures over time.
“Course of Business” Offices – There are roughly 3,000
counties, 50 states and 94 federal jurisdictions in the
U.S. criminal justice system. Of these, fewer than 30
have established CRUs. One reason for this is the belief
held by many conscientious DAs that the cases suitable
for CRU review already are being handled as part of the
office’s existing caseload; if so, these DAs believe, there is
no need to create a separate structure for them. As one
DA who has not created a CRU in her district explained,
It’s not as formal as what I think people
do in what they call their Conviction
Review Units, but I think our office has
always done that. We always have an
open mind and we’ll look at it. And I
can’t give you statistical information on
anything like that, but it’s been a part
of the culture of the office since the
day I started.

A number of prosecutors in offices with newer CRUs have
also hastened to make this point. For them, the CRU is
an explicit effort to address community skepticism about

prosecutorial motives and to make plain to laymen what
the prosecutors have believed their whole careers: that
no prosecutor wants to convict an innocent person. If a
mistake has been made, or is being made, the prosecutor
should be open and objective about the information
available, and work hard to ensure that a fair and just
result is achieved at any and all times. As Clackamas
County (OR) DA John Foote said, “I think every lawyer
in our office is responsible for conviction integrity… It’s
not some specialty. To me, it goes with the job.”24
Whether the CRU is local or state-wide, the specific model
of the CRU is less relevant than how the office chooses to
embrace and communicate the philosophy of conviction
integrity over time. The sincere CRU’s philosophy of
objective and open investigation should be our aspiration
in every criminal case. At the same time, the CRU is reinvestigating cases that have been seen as “victories,” both
for the prosecutors that secured them and for the Office
as a whole. Thus, a new CRU often starts with a headwind
of suspicion, both from within (e.g., other prosecutors in
the Office who don’t want their cases reviewed for error)
and without (e.g., defense attorneys who doubt the true
motives of the CRU and view it as a publicity stunt).
Those supporting the initiative point out that the creation
of a CRU is entirely voluntary on the part of the District
Attorney, and ask for the benefit of the doubt; skeptics
reply that DAs are motivated to appease both the general
population and the line prosecutors within the office,
and worry that the unit conducts “Conviction Review In
Name Only (CRINO),”25 while making no real provision
for the sort of extrajudicial analysis described above.26 A
CRINO is arguably worse than no CRU at all, since it
not only retards the progress of criminal justice accuracy
and reform, it makes the operation of sincere CRUs more
difficult in other jurisdictions.

“Multnomah County DA assigns veteran prosecutor to guard against wrongful convictions,” The Oregonian, Oct. 26, 2014, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/
portland/index.ssf/2014/10/multnomah_county_da_assigns_ve.html.

24

The CRINO acronym is the creation of Professor Ron Sullivan of Harvard Law School. Others have referred to similar organizations that pay lip service to
conviction review but act solely to affirm existing convictions as “conviction preservation units.”

25

One CRU head who participated in this research expressed a deeply felt concern that “to label [a CRU] as insincere, bad-faith, and ‘in name only’… is disrespectful
to prosecutors who, at this early stage of the conviction integrity movement, are in good faith attempting to develop conviction review programs.”

26
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To address these concerns, and to signify to all stakeholders
that the CRU is a good faith attempt to accomplish the
wide variety of system benefits described above, sincere
CRUs should emphasize:
(1) the independence of the CRU and actively support
its broad-based mission that elevates truth and
accuracy above judicial decisions and procedure;
(2) the flexibility and freedom of the CRU to
investigate broadly and deeply across allegations
of actual innocence in its own discretion; and
(3) efforts by the CRU to provide transparency with
regard to its activities and impact.
These concepts of independence, flexibility and
transparency are part of any high-quality public agency,
and should already be the foundation of daily operations
throughout a DA’s Office. Applying them specifically
to the operations of the CRU, however, will allow it to
engage more collaboratively and effectively with others in
the system, to the benefit of all.
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A Note for Jurisdictions with
Fewer Attorneys
The majority of jurisdictions with CRUs are large, urban
or suburban jurisdictions with more than 50 prosecutors,
and most of the observations in this paper come from
offices with greater than 30 attorneys. That does not mean
that the philosophies and practices of a strong CRU don’t
apply to smaller prosecutors’ offices. Errors may occur in
jurisdictions large or small, and there is no data to suggest
that a rural DA in a 1-2 attorney office is any more or
less able to avoid, detect, or remedy error than prosecutors
working in the larger offices.

It should be noted, though, that many smaller state or local
prosecutors’ offices may lack the resources to separately
staff a CRU. It would be impossible, for example, to
create a formal independent CRU in a DA’s Office that
has one prosecutor. This does not mean that smaller DA’s
Offices are free from an obligation to conduct good faith
independent reviews of colorable post-conviction claims
of actual innocence, and smaller offices should ensure
that their communities are provided with a clear path
to submit such claims. This could be done by sharing
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responsibility for case reviews with larger offices within
the jurisdiction, by engaging a volunteer panel on an ad
hoc basis and contracting out leadership of case reviews
as needed, or through a statewide organization, as has
been done in North Carolina.27 The important thing is
to ensure that size and resources not impose a limitation
on the ability of the DA’s Office to provide justice to all
of its citizens.
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27
Only one jurisdiction, Colorado, has attempted to manage a CRU through the state Attorney General, and that was done for a limited “Special Purpose CRU”
model involving cases where guilt or innocence could be conclusively proven through DNA. This model ran into some jurisdictional challenges as not all District
Attorneys welcomed the AG’s participation, but it could be useful as a way to ensure that plausible claims of actual innocence do not get overlooked or fall between
the cracks in smaller jurisdictions with fewer resources for CRU-type investigations.

CRU Independence
While CRUs investigate and make recommendations
about cases, virtually every office we spoke to reserved
for the District Attorney the sole discretion to make final
decisions about CRU petitions.28 Given the potential
political ramifications of moving to vacate a secured
conviction, this is not surprising. At the same time, in
order for the CRU to be effective, the CRU must convey
an ability to make difficult decisions that may seem to be
in opposition to the Office or its line attorneys, without
penalty or second-guessing. The CRU must be open
to the possibility that mistakes have been made in the
Office over time, and it must have the support of the DA
and Office leadership to conduct full investigations that
may dredge up unpleasant facts for the DA or his or her
colleagues. In short, the CRU must be independent in its

decision making, focused only on the assessment of guilt
or innocence and supported in full by the DA without
thought to the political ramifications of its actions.
A CRU’s independence can be measured in multiple
ways. We can look to its place within the organizational
structure, the ability of resources to conduct its work, or
the number of people who can influence or approve its
recommendations or actions on specific cases, for example.
These issues can and should be viewed in aggregation to
evaluate the extent to which the CRU is operating free
from the control or bias of others and is empowered to
conduct and act upon the extrajudicial, fact-based case
review that should be the CRU’s main objective.

28
One office permitted the CRU head to make independent decisions about lower-level or nonviolent cases, but reserved the DA’s ability to decide on all violent
felonies.
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CRU Chain of Command
The ultimate question facing a CRU is whether the DA’s
Office should act to vacate a conviction. While offices we
interviewed had multiple different processes, all agreed
that the role of the CRU is to advise the DA on how to
answer this important question, and not to actually answer
the question itself. The CRU is expected to conduct a
thorough investigation and give a recommendation to
the District Attorney, who retains the sole discretion on
whether to vacate or reverse a conviction.29
The district attorney of course is free to
do whatever he pleases on these cases
despite what recommendation the CRU
may have and what recommendation
the [external committee] may have.
It is always going to be ultimately his
decision.

In part because the DA has the final word on all CRU
activities, it is important that the DA signify strong
support for the undertaking. This reduces efforts to
circumvent or ignore the CRU’s requests for information
or assistance.
While DAs have found various ways to communicate
their strong support for a sincere CRU, one common
method is to have the CRU report directly to the DA.
The DA’s personal involvement and awareness of dayto-day activities makes clear his or her commitment
to the unit and provides more freedom to the CRU to
conduct investigations free of potential conflicts, while
minimizing the impact of others who may be less
enthusiastic about the work of the CRU. Most CRUs
have been implemented as direct reports to the DA him/
herself; those that have not typically report to the First
Assistant DA or to the Chief of the Appellate Unit, who
then reports to the DA.
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Figure 4. CRU Reports Directly to DA
(n=20)
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¢  Yes         ¢  No
Separating the CRU from the Appellate or
Habeas Unit
A more subtle, but very important reason to have the
CRU report directly to the DA involves the interplay
between the CRU and an office’s existing structure for
handling appeals, including post-conviction appeals.
In organizations where no CRU exists, questions of
inaccurate convictions typically arise as part of the
appellate process, whether the basis for the appeal is legal
or factual. Placing a CRU in the office’s appellate or habeas
unit therefore makes intuitive sense. Appellate attorneys
within the DA’s Office will have considerable experience
with the different types of arguments made by individuals
protesting their convictions, and most, of the challenges
will proceed through the post-conviction appeals process
in the court. Placing the CRU within the appellate unit
thus makes for an efficient use of resources, providing a
pool of attorneys who can be deployed as necessary to

29
Presumably, a DA who repeatedly overturns or ignores recommendations from his CRU to vacate convictions will be subject to public skepticism about, if not
accountability for, his or her sincerity in the conviction review process.

handle credible allegations of factual innocence and does
not require a restructuring of the senior management
team in the office.
On the other hand, many attorneys – both defense and
prosecutors – view the role of an appellate attorney
within a DA’s Office as fundamentally different from the
underlying goal of a CRU. As one veteran prosecutor
stated,
[The Office Appeals Bureau] has a
different interest than what we have.
They, beginning with the appeal through
the post-conviction process, are trained
and tasked to defend the conviction.

These observers worry that the core purpose of a typical
appeals unit within a DA’s Office is the preservation,
rather than the review of properly achieved convictions.
Put differently, the prosecutorial mindset of an appellate
lawyer presupposes guilt and relies on the appellate
court to review the conviction and identify any potential
errors. Where it exists, this mindset may undermine the
ability of the appellate prosecutor to consider innocence
objectively.
Well, here’s a good example: we had a
rape case that had been sitting in the
office for a year or two when I got it.  
Arrested in 1992. Convicted in 1994.  
It was a gang rape case and evidence
not revealed to the defense at the time
of trial showed that the complaining
witness, a 13-year old girl, had all kinds
of psychological disorders and an IQ
of 71. A defense expert now says that
would lead to confabulation, that she
would perceive injustice where none
existed, and try to get even for it.
Which is exactly what she said she had
done after the trial.  After the trial back

in 1994 she immediately recanted and
said she had done exactly that, that she
was mad at two of these defendants
because she thought they were friends
of hers and they hadn’t helped her.  
And she made up their involvement.
For some reason the trial judge didn’t
believe her recantation and some years
went by.And here’s [where the mindset
comes in.] A couple of lawyers in our
appeals section said, maybe we can
make a claim on latches because they
could have brought this title, they could
have brought this claim years ago.  And
I said, it’s called conviction integrity. I’m
not gonna use some technical defense
to keep from addressing the merits
of this case. And I’m afraid that’s what
would have happened if someone in
[the CRU leadership] job had that sort
of prosecutorial mindset of how can
we defend this?

Prosecutors who make this observation are not criticizing
their appellate colleagues. In the vast majority of cases,
the DA’s Office has no reason to believe that a mistake has
been made, and every reason to believe that an individual
has been properly convicted of criminal conduct.
Litigating such cases in the appellate courts with the goal
of maintaining the conviction is exactly what prosecutors
are supposed to do in our adversarial system. At the
same time, a review process based on a pre-established
and unreviewable definition of fact, except in cases based
on allegations of “newly discovered evidence” that was
“not available to the defendant at the time of trial” is not
the same as the extrajudicial, outcome-neutral review of
factual innocence that is at the core of the CRU’s mission.
Asking Assistant District Attorneys inculcated in the
former to suddenly start engaging in the latter may not
always be immediately successful.
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Structurally and philosophically, then, sincere CRUs
define their mission as separate and apart from the
mission of the Office’s appellate unit. In fact, as many
have commented, a case of actual innocence may actually
be suffocated by formalized due process or habeas corpus
rules, which are focused more on the need for judicial
efficiency, finality, and speculative discourse on what
“could” have been available to a defendant at time of trial
as opposed to a candid and open review of whether the
individual actually committed the crime charged.30

Figure 5. CRU Separate From Habeas/
Appellate Unit (n=21)
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52%

¢  Yes         ¢  No

The belief that a CRU and an appellate unit should not
coexist is not a universal view. Some actively encourage
the use of appellate attorneys for case reviews:
I almost invariably pull out of our
[appellate] unit, since they’re used
to doing the post-conviction type
of inquiries. And this is work that is
analogous to a habeas petition. So it’s
a pretty [important] skill set.

Others believe that adding the fact-based reviews
of a CRU is actually a benefit to the appellate unit,
precisely because it shows the appellate attorneys a
different mindset and approach to appellate litigation.
Philadelphia’s Conviction Review Unit, for example,
consciously placed its CRU within the Appellate Unit,
in part because the DA wanted the CRU head to educate
the appellate attorneys on how fact-based reviews might
lead to different appellate reviews.31 Under this view,
CRUs might have a liberating effect on appellate units
that view their job as “conviction preservation,” rather
than muffling the independence of the CRU’s fact-based
investigations. Similarly, the Washington, D.C. CRU has
been created as part of its Special Proceedings Division,
the unit that handles post-conviction appeals.32 Further
evaluation of these structures and the impact of the
CRUs in offices that take each view will be useful.

It is for this reason that several DAs have separated their
CRU and its fact-based assessments from their appellate/
post-conviction review unit and its due process-driven
advocacy (See Figure 5). A sample organizational
structure is depicted in Figure 6.
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30
See, e.g., Seaman, Julie, “When Innocence is No Defense,” New York Times, August 12, 2015, Bookman, Marc, “Does an Innocent Man Have the Right to Be
Exonerated?,” The Atlantic, December 6, 2014.
31

Personal Communication with Mark Gilson, Philadelphia DA’s Office, December 11, 2014.

Part of the rationale for placing the CRU in Washington, DC in the appellate unit was results-oriented and not indicative of a particular mindset regarding the
underlying cases. As a political and economic matter, the creation of the CRU required new resources, and those resources could not be created without going up a
long chain of command. Thus, institutional and/or budgetary factors may also control the location of the CRU in a particular office.
32

Figure 6. Potential Organizational Chart Including a Conviction Review Unit
District Attorney

Deputy DA, Felony

Deputy DA, CRU

Deputy DA, Misdemeanor

Training

Deputy DA, Appellate

Ethics Officer

Deputy DA, Chiefs

External Advisory Board

First Assistant DA

State Bar Disciplinary Board

Selecting CRU Leadership
DAs who have established CRUs are mindful that the
individual in charge of the CRU will have a significant
impact not just on the Unit’s effectiveness, but on its
perception both inside and outside the office. One DA
put it this way:
We all know the people in any group
that are not “yes men,” so to speak. I
hire people that are going to keep an
open mind, that are always saying “yeah,
but what about this?” Those are the
type of people that I look for.You need
people that are going to be strong
willed, especially for a Conviction
Review Unit model because they
may be in a situation where their coworker’s case is going to be dismissed.
That [co-worker] may not agree with
the decision, so you certainly can’t be a
pushover. It takes a certain personality,
I think, to be in these units.
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See pages 67-70 for the view of the NCIIC, which uses a different model.

The choice of leadership for a CRU sends a variety of
important messages to all stakeholders and external
observers. Sensitive to this, DAs have without exception
appointed experienced, veteran prosecutors to lead the
“traditional” CRU.33 First and foremost, this is sensible
in terms of the highly technical work that needs to be
done. Appointing a CRU head with a wide range of
trial experiences should enable the CRU to identify the
hallmarks of a questionable conviction and to review
effectively an emotionally charged case where the facts
may have happened decades prior.
For internal stakeholders within the office, the
appointment of a veteran prosecutor who has risen
through the ranks in the DA’s Office signifies the DA’s
commitment to the Unit and provides it with the
credibility to advocate for overturning a conviction where
appropriate, even when such advocacy could result in the
criticism (perceived or real) of a valued colleague.
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Finally, the choice of a leader for the CRU conveys
volumes to external observers about the likely approach
that the CRU will take. Installing as the CRU leader an
individual with broad experience in prosecuting “tough
cases” within the office signifies a belief that conviction
reviews are important enough to warrant the focus of a
seasoned trial attorney, whose skills could be effectively
used on important contemporary felony prosecutions. At
the same time, a CRU head should not simply be a talented
prosecutor. Appointing an individual who can listen to
opposing viewpoints and assess claims of prosecutorial
error calmly, openly and objectively, and who is capable of
building relationships with defense counsel, will convey
to the community that the CRU – and by extension, the
DA – has intellectual independence, with the ability and
the will to review cases on their substantive merits even if
the ultimate result may not support the prior conviction.
Both the perception and the reality of this independence
are important to the CRU’s effectiveness going forward.
Participation of External Stakeholders.
An important question about CRU operations is whether
and how to involve external voices in the CRU’s planning
or day-to-day activities. Many observers of criminal
justice, both within and outside DA’s offices, express
concern about the potential for confirmation34 or other
cognitive35 biases to arise within a prosecutor’s office (or,
of course, in any criminal justice agency, including defense
offices or courts) given the repetition of the cases and the
need for constant advocacy for criminal accountability.
These biases can lead to a “prosecutorial mindset” that
rejects claims of actual innocence out of hand, even while
acknowledging their potential for existence.
Believing that CRU independence means intellectual
freedom from such biases, many DAs have designed
various structures to ensure that an independent, defenseoriented perspective is available to assist and inform the
CRU’s views, either for specific cases or by influencing
the unit’s policies and procedures.
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The CRU that has most aggressively embraced third-party
participation in the activities of its CRU is in Brooklyn,
NY, where Kings County District Attorney DA Kenneth
Thompson asked Ron Sullivan, a Harvard Law Professor
and former Federal Public Defender and Director of
the Public Defender Service for Washington, D.C., to
coordinate the establishment of the office’s CRU with a
veteran ADA appointed from within as its operational
leader. Bringing in third-party participants, especially
those with first-hand criminal defense experience, can
impact the entire CRU’s approach to cases of actual
innocence:
[What] we are trying to create [is] an
ethos. It’s an attitude, it’s a perception.
It should be the bedrock that… you’re
trying to do the correct thing, the just
thing and not necessarily doing the
thing just that just favors your side.  
Now this is very contraindicated to
people who get in to trial work on
both sides, because people who get
into trial work are highly competitive
people… That is a sea change that
we’re trying to get in terms of attitude
among prosecutors.

External participation may be integrated in the CRU’s
process as individuals or by committee, and at various
points throughout the case review process. Third parties
may assist CRUs in developing policy and procedures,
helping to think through operational hurdles and
generating political support for the unit within the office
and across the jurisdiction. They may also participate in
or review the work and recommendations of the CRU,
to minimize the risk of unintentional or unobserved
confirmation bias or other cognitive bias on the part of
the case reviewers.
A majority of offices, however, have not yet embraced
third-party participation in their CRUs. While the

34
Confirmation bias is a type of cognitive bias defined as “the tendency to interpret new evidence as confirmation of one’s existing beliefs or theories.” Oxford English
Dictionary Online, accessed Nov. 27, 2015.
35
Cognitive bias is “the common tendency to acquire and process information by filtering it through one’s own likes, dislikes, and experiences.” Businessdictionary.
com, accessed Nov. 27, 2015. Subtypes of cognitive bias include confirmation bias, fundamental attribution error (FAE), belief bias, framing, or hindsight bias, among
others. Wikipedia, “cognitive bias,” accessed Nov. 27, 2015.

obvious reason for this is a disinterest in sharing errors
with external individuals, there are other rationales for an
internal case review process. Some DAs view the CRU
case review process as identical to the review of any other
criminal prosecution; since a typical case review is handled
entirely within the DA’s Office, the thinking goes, so
should the CRU case review. For others, the exclusion of
third parties is more political in nature. he mere creation
of a CRU can be viewed by some as revolutionary. To add
to that the ability of external individuals to second-guess
the office’s decisions would simply be too much change at
once, and several prosecutors have decided to assess this
carefully before adding external participants:

advisors assist the DA and CRU in structural
and procedural issues, but participation in the
investigation of, or recommendations about
specific cases is limited to individuals within the
DA’s Office.
•

In Oneida County (NY), a panel called the
Conviction Integrity Program (CIP) Committee
is convened to review the CRU’s recommendation
to initiate a formal investigation into a case.37
The panel consists of the CRU coordinator,
three Assistant DAs, three forensic experts, and
one community representative. A second sevenmember committee – four assistant prosecutors,
two police officers and one civilian – receives and
reviews the final recommendation for action from
the CRU before it is sent to the District Attorney.

It’s all within the office.We’ve discussed
some and I’m interested in these
outside panels that some of the units
have around the country. We’re not
real sure what we want to do with that
right now. We’re looking at potentially
outside panels working more in the
training aspect than an oversight sort
of outside folks.

The US Attorney’s Office for the District of
Columbia has announced a similar approach,
and plans to send completed case review
recommendations to a review panel that includes
two attorneys, one a career prosecutor and one a
former attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund.38

Whatever the reason for not including external
participants, it is seized upon by skeptics of the CRU as
proof that the inherent conflict of a CRU reviewing its
own office’s cases is not being conducted in good faith.
This is discussed in greater depth in the “transparency”
section of this paper.

Another approach has been taken by Middlesex
County (MA), which hired a veteran of the
Pennsylvania Innocence Project as the screening
attorney for its CRU, to ensure that the initial
review of petitions for review are at once
internal and informed by a defense-oriented and
potentially innocence-oriented perspective.

Where third-party participation is permitted, CRUs
deploy them in a variety of ways:
•

External Advisors in Policy, Not in Case Review.
The CRU established by New York County (NY)
includes a Policy Advisory Panel “comprised of
leading criminal justice experts, including legal
scholars and former prosecutors, who advise the
Office on national best practices and evolving
issues in the area of wrongful convictions.”36 These

36

http://manhattanda.org/preventing-wrongful-convictions, accessed August 18, 2015.

37

Oneida County District Attorney’s Office Conviction Integrity Program.

Blend of External and Internal Personnel for
Case Review.

•

External Case Review Committee.
The CRU in Lake County (IL) is staffed with
volunteers of varied criminal justice backgrounds,

38
United States Department of Justice Press Release, “U.S. Attorney Machen Announces Selection of Consultants To Work With Office’s New Conviction Integrity
Unit,” Jan. 12, 2015, available at https://www.bja.gov/Publications/ConvictionIntegrityUnit_PR.pdf.
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each of whom lives and works outside of Lake
County. The goal is to ensure that no case reviewer
has any particular history with, pre-existing
opinion about, or stake in the outcome of an
individual case, and to separate the panel’s advice
from other political influences related to the
potential for civil settlements, etc.
In Kings County (NY) the CRU meets regularly
with an independent panel consisting of external
participants as a way of shaping case reviews in
process. The leadership of the office explains the
benefits of engaging with external participants as
follows:
We have this independent review panel
which looks over everything we’ve
done, looks at our recommendation
and gives us a direction, or asks for
additional materials so that they can
continue to investigate the cases and
then make their recommendation to
the district attorney.  The independent
review panel is a check on the good
faith that… hopefully can be ratified
by these distinguished attorneys in the
community who have no connection
to district attorney’s office, aren’t paid
by the district attorney, are doing this
completely voluntarily and frankly they
don’t have a dog in the fight. I think
that is a very important perceptual
element about what we’re doing, that
everything that we do as prosecutors
is being reviewed by this independent
review panel and that they make their
own recommendation independent
of what we do.   The independent
review panel makes its own rules.
They discuss it among themselves,
[and] make various requests if they
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find it necessary for more information.  
Ultimately, they come back and say
thumbs up or thumbs down on the
case. Again, that is a recommendation
that goes to the district attorney, along
with our recommendation. The DA
makes the ultimate decision.

As with any cross-disciplinary group, these external
advisory or review boards can run into challenges. One
CRU chose to disband its external review board after the
group, which consisted of a former federal prosecutor,
an experienced former police officer, and representatives
from the defense bar and civil rights groups, could not
reach a consensus on the merits of a particular case.
Whether this sort of action reflects a “CRINO” or is
simply a failure of consensus-building will be a case by
case determination.

Figure 7. CRUs with External Participants
(n=15)
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The impact of external participants on CRUs is
impossible to measure at this time – and of course, no
structure guarantees the optimal process. An objective,
unbiased, thoughtful case review may occur in a closed,
internal-only process just as a subjective, biased, shallow
review may occur in a process that involves only external
reviewers. What is more clear is that many DAs and
CRU heads see value in enlisting the views of thoughtful
individuals who bring open minds to the idea of what a
CRU ought to do, how it should operate, the mechanics
of case reviews, and the validity of its conclusions and
recommendations. These advantages are both substantive,
in that they minimize opportunities for bias, and
perceptual, in that they respond to concerns of bias or
favoritism towards the DA’s Office in the review.

Participation of Personnel from Underlying
Case in Case Review
Another aspect of CRU independence is ensuring that
the CRU’s case investigations are not being led by the
same prosecutors who participated in the underlying
conviction that is currently being called into question.
CRUs are unanimous that prosecutor(s) or investigator(s)
who participated in the original case and conviction may
not lead the CRU’s case review. Most offices also require
the recusal of the original prosecutor from panels or
committees reviewing CRU recommendations:

Part of the concern is a sensitivity to the emotions of the
original prosecutor, who is likely to suffer from substantial
regret or guilt if he prosecuted and convicted someone of
a crime in error.39
I’ll come in and they’ll be like, “[o]hh,
what did I do?” Certain officers do
the same thing… And you know what?
Sometimes they want to know. They
are like, “Did I make a mistake?” They
really want to know, did I do something
wrong, because nobody I’ve talked to,
wants [to convict] the wrong person.

While the sensitivity of prosecutors to having their work
criticized is a potential barrier to gathering accurate
information about the case, it must also be recognized
that the original prosecutor or investigator is likely to be
the individual in the office most familiar not only with
the facts of the case, but with surrounding circumstances
that add context and meaning to the investigation and
the actions taken by the DA’s Office in the underlying
case. Accordingly, most CRUs agree that the original
prosecutor(s) should be interviewed about the case, but
not involved in any substantive decision regarding the
case review.

I personally don’t tell [the original
prosecutors] much… First of all, I
don’t really care what they have to
say because they are going to have
opinions and I don’t want opinions,
I want facts. I also don’t want to get
them involved in it because I have to
keep a clear mind myself.

39
In this sense, the prosecutor or investigator in a conviction that ultimately is proven to be mistaken can be termed a “second victim,” with the first victim being the
individual who has been exonerated. See Dekker, Sydney, Second Victim: Error, Guilt, Trauma, and Resilience, CRC Press, 2013. See also Stroud, Marty, Keynote Address,
“Defining Quality in Criminal Justice,” Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice Spring Symposium, May, 2015, available at https://www.law.upenn.
edu/institutes/quattronecenter/conference/springsymposium2015/videos.php.
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Staffing and Resources Necessary for the
CRU
Another key factor in the independence of the CRU is
the amount of dedicated resources available to it. As Vice
President Joseph Biden is fond of saying, “Don’t show
me your values. Show me your budget, and I will tell you
what you value.”40 A CRU without dedicated resources
must compete for resources within the DA’s Office that
are conducting more traditional prosecutorial work; this
enables supervisors and managers who may not appreciate
the goals of the CRU to exert negative pressure on the
Unit. Even managers who support the CRU may find it
difficult and counterproductive to volunteer prosecutor/
investigator resources to the CRU if that means creating
an additional burden on the entire office.
DAs, and in some instances the federal government41
have provided widely varying amounts of manpower
and money to CRUs. Occasionally, a CRU will be
funded through an additional line item in a DA’s budget,
supported by a Mayor or county executive with control
over the DA’s budget. More frequently, however, DAs
who wish to establish and maintain CRUs must do so
without additional budget dollars, and operate within the
existing budget for the office.
Whether the office has specifically created a CRU or not,
many prosecutors we spoke to believe that identifying and
resolving inaccurate convictions is an important part of
the prosecutorial role, and thus should be part of the day
to day operations of the office. It is the DA’s responsibility
to secure necessary funds to properly investigate cases
with alleged errors, without compromising the ability to
process new criminal cases. This can be a challenge:
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40

[Erroneous convictions are] a problem
[my county executives don’t] see the
benefit of. [My] belief in its utility is
strong, but hard to translate to those
who control the county budget. [My]
in-house attorneys do work on this
above their caseload, since there can
be no reduction in caseload to handle
CRU work, and our external board is
all volunteer.

While it is easy to point out that CRUs must be
appropriately staffed, budgeting in most DA’s Offices is
a zero-sum game. Every dollar committed to a CRU to
review potentially erroneous convictions is a dollar not
available to promote the DA’s other initiatives, and while
the office should receive a benefit from the transparency,
accountability, and justice principles exemplified by the
CRU, there is also some risk of the public perception that
tax dollars are going to fix mistakes rather than to improve
community safety and justice moving forward.42 The
decision of how to staff the CRU, then, occurs within the
context of the Office’s overall goals and obligations, and
depends upon the availability of resources, the expected
funnel of petitions for case review, and the number of
actual investigations that will need to be conducted in the
coming year – inquiries that require data collection and
analysis for accuracy.43 Such data, which is rarely collected
by CRUs, could also be used to secure additional funding
for the DA’s Office, but will still be competing with other
policy initiatives for a limited “pot” of city or county
resources.

http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/10478-don-t-tell-me-what-you-value-show-me-your-budget

The “Special Project” CRUs in Colorado and Wayne County (MI) were supported by federal grants supporting forensic testing. These groups conducted testing as
permitted by the funding, then largely stopped working upon the expiration of the federal funds.
41

42
Some enterprising DAs use their civil forfeiture fund to pay for the additional costs of their CRUs, though recent public focus on the potential for conflict of
interest when a DA’s annual budget is supplemented through forfeiture may limit this option in the future.
43
Some DAs, when defending their decision not to create a CRU, state that the number of cases ripe for review in the jurisdiction are minimal, simultaneously
underscoring the Office’s quality and deferring the case review process. Whether such a belief is accurate or merely politically expedient can be difficult to prove in
most jurisdictions.

Table 1. Dedicated Resources for Conviction Review Units.
Attorneys
Fully
Dedicated
CRUa

Attorneys
Partially
Dedicated
to CRUa

Los Angeles County (CA)

3

0

N. Carolina Inn.
Inquiry Comm.

3

0

Cook County (IL)

3b

2

Harris County (TX)

2

San Diego Cty (CA)

2

Kings Cty (NY)
Dallas County (TX)

Jurisdiction

10

8

10

6 on call

5 in pool

5.2

1

1

4.3

0

0

0

3.3

10

0

3

3

2.6

2

0

0.5

1

2.5

5

1

0

As needed

0

1.8

1

2

1.8

2

1.6

Bexar County (TX)

3

Wayne County (MI)

3

New York County (NY)

2

Philadelphia County (PA)

1

As needed

1.6

1

1.4
1.3

0

1.0

0

1

Ventura County (CA)

0

4

Middlesex County (MA)

1

2 per case

As needed

1

0.83

Baltimore (MD)

3

0

As needed

2.5

0.82

Suffolk County (MA)

1

>1

>1

0.77

Lake County (IL)

3

1

3

As needed

1

Pima County (AZ)

Oneida County (NY)
b

1.9

1

Cuyahoga County (OH)

a

Jurisdiction
Population
(in millions)44

1

Santa Clara County (CA)

Nassau County (NY)

Investigators		
Dedicated
CRU
to CRU
Staff

0.84

3

0.70
1

0.23

Case Review only; does not include review committees or policy committees
One FTE funded by federal grant, not by office

44

U.S. Census figures, 2010.
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The resources needed to properly staff a CRU varies both
office to office and year to year. Los Angeles County’s
announcement of its new CRU was accompanied by
an ongoing budget allotment of $1 million. The Dallas
CRU was created after a public hearing with County
Commissioners in 2007 and secured almost $400,000
in additional funding to dedicate two assistant district
attorneys, the chief prosecutor, an additional investigator,
and a paralegal; presumably these individuals have
continued to work on the County payroll in these
capacities.45 Bexar County (TX), whose CRU was started
in 2015, has assigned three FTEs to its CRU; while these
are currently funded by existing operations funds, the DA
hopes to change this to line item support in the next fiscal
year.
The North Carolina State legislature, in creating the
NCIIC for a state with roughly the same population
(~10 million people) as Los Angeles County, budgeted
$550,000 per year to the NCIIC, a sum almost completely
expended on the six full-time staff of the Commission
that are needed to keep up with incoming petitions and
ongoing case investigations. The Commission’s statefunded budget also provides $8,500 per year for DNA
and forensic testing and $6,421 per year for consulting
with experts. This budget leaves the Commission
without sufficient funding to conduct all of the DNA or
other forensic testing it deems necessary to thoroughly
investigate the cases in its pipeline. The Commission
spends an average of $85,000 on DNA testing and an
additional $7,750 on scientific experts each year, which
does not include the costs of prosecutors or judges who
participate in hearings to adjudicate cases where the
NCIIC believes there is sufficient evidence to overturn
a conviction.
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Grant money designed to help law enforcement deal
with testing backlogs can ameliorate funding pressures
somewhat, and has been helpful in Cook County (IL),
North Carolina, and other jurisdictions, providing
human resources and money for evidence testing. For
example, the NCIIC has in the past secured funding
from the National Institute of Justice, the research arm
of the Department of Justice. The money, in the form of a
“Bloodsworth Grant” from NIJ (three years at $250,000
per year), provided an additional 2 FTEs and funds to be
used for DNA testing, other forensic testing, and expert
witnesses in cases where DNA could be used to provide
conclusive evidence of the innocence or guilt of the
petitioner. Even with this additional funding, however,
the Commission has found it impossible to pay for all
the testing it seeks, and its request to the North Carolina
Legislature for an additional $100,000 for this purpose
was denied.

45
Moore, Terri, “Prosecutors Reinvestigate Questionable Evidence: Dallas Establishes a `Conviction Integrity Unit,’” Criminal Justice, Volume 26, Number 3, Fall
2011.

CRU Flexibility
Prosecutors conducting the extrajudicial fact-based
assessments of actual innocence at the core of the
CRU’s mission are confronted with a limitless variety
of circumstances, rationales, and scenarios supporting
allegations of actual innocence. Each case presents
prosecutors with unique challenges in deciding which
cases to accept for review, how those reviews should be
conducted, and what actions to take at the conclusion
of the review to ensure justice is done. The questions
confronting CRUs include both the aspirational and the
practical; attorneys we spoke to struggle with finding an
optimal balance between the need for flexibility in case
acceptance and the need to prioritize limited resources.
Attorneys also struggle with a consistent definition
of “conviction integrity.” While some cases of guilt or

innocence are clear (or can become clear with some
investigation), many investigations conducted by CRUs
result in the conclusion that while there are definite
weaknesses in the state’s case, there is also evidence
linking the petitioner to the crime. In such cases, how can
the CRU draw an acceptable balance between ensuring
that all of its convictions have “integrity,” as opposed to
becoming, in the words of one CRU head, a “13th juror”
overturning appropriate convictions?
CRUs are not uniform in their answers to these questions,
but the Units that (1) maximize their flexibility in case
intake, investigation, review and recommendation; (2)
minimize their restrictions on cases eligible for review;
and (3) take advantage of external participants are
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more effective at realizing the core mission of accurate
evaluations of claims of actual innocence. Ensuring the
flexibility necessary for the CRU to achieve its mission is
the focus of our next section.

The Conviction Review Case Funnel
Leaders of CRUs agree that their willingness to vacate a
previously secured conviction outside the existing appeals
process is dependent on a finding of actual innocence –
that is, either the petitioner did not commit the crime
charged, or no crime was committed under the facts as
now understood. None of the CRUs we spoke to felt that
their role was to review a case where actual innocence was
not the core of the rationale for why a petitioner’s case
should be reviewed.
From this agreed upon baseline, however, there is some
deviation among offices regarding the cases a CRU will

accept. The fundamental question that is asked by the
CRU from its initial receipt of petitioner’s request for
review to the DA’s ultimate decision on the case remains
the same: are there sufficient facts reviewable by the CRU
in support of the actual innocence of the petitioner to
justify continuing an investigation? The answer varies by
the stage of the process and is conducted differently by
each CRU.
Each CRU has unique requirements or standards of
proof for deciding which petitions will be accepted,
reviewed, and investigated, but the process that a petition
must go through within the CRU is uniform. A graphic
representation of this “case funnel” from the submission to
the CRU of a claim of innocence through the DA’s action
to vacate or reverse a conviction that is now believed to
have been reached in error is shown in Figure 8, below.

Figure 8. Case Funnel for CRU Review.
Requests for Review
(Multiple Sources)
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VACATE/DISMISS

Parking Lot:
“Closed”
Cases

Petitions submitted to CRUs for review will proceed
through the following stages:
•

Intake. Intake policies or procedures are
focused on the CRU’s response to the initial
request that the CRU review a case.

•

Screening. If a case meets the baseline criteria
for consideration by the office, it will be
reviewed by an individual within the CRU for
a minimum requisite level of credibility.

•

Investigation. At this stage, the CRU devotes
more substantial resources to the review,
typically a lead prosecutor and perhaps an
investigator at a minimum. The goal is to reach
a definitive conclusion about the appropriate
resolution of the case.

•

Recommendation. The conclusions of the
investigation are provided to the District
Attorney with a recommendation for action.
For many CRUs, the recommendation phase
occurs in conjunction with a review board of
one type or another.

•

Action. The DA decides what action should
be taken in the case. If the petitioner’s
assertions of innocence have prevailed, the DA
approaches the court with a proposal to either
exonerate and release the defendant or drop
the charges and lay the groundwork for a new
trial.

The precise shape of the funnel will vary office by office
based on the CRU’s criteria for case advancement and
on the way it conducts its reviews. Offices with broad
policies for case intake and screening, and those perceived
to conduct good-faith investigations, are more likely to
receive a large number of petitions and thus a wide “top”
of the funnel, with the funnel narrowing based on the
amount of rigor applied at each downstream phase. Other
offices that employ strict criteria or high standards of proof
at the recommendation phase may find fewer petitions,
but a higher percentage of completed investigations after
case acceptance, and very few cases that proceed to the
DA with a recommendation to set aside the conviction.
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Figure 9. Impact of Screening Policies on Case Review Funnels.
Flexible Screening
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VACATE/RETRY

VACATE/DISMISS

While the shape of a CRU’s case funnel is not conclusive
evidence of the sincerity of the CRU in the conviction
review process, it is worth noting that the CRU case funnel
is affected not just by the facts of the cases submitted to
the CRU, but by the fact that petitions are submitted
at all. The funnel of cases available for CRU review is
smaller than it could be in a number of jurisdictions with
CRUs, as defense counsel who lack faith in the CRU (in
other words, who believe that the CRU is a CRINO)
simply do not submit their cases to the CRU for review.
As one defense attorney put it, “Why would I provide
the DA’s Office with an opportunity to learn more about
my case outside of appellate litigation if the case review
conducted by the CRU is not sincere? I’m just giving up
leverage and not getting anything useful for my client.”
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VACATE/RETRY

VACATE/DISMISS

Thus, an underfunded CRU or a CRU not engaged in good
faith case review may find it has fewer cases to review not
because the cases of error do not exist in the jurisdiction,
but because the CRU’s relationship with the defense bar
(and vice versa) convinces innocent individuals to pursue
litigation rather than trust in a collaborative process. In
such situations, the CRU (or perhaps CRINO) actually
is doing more harm than good on several levels: (1) it has
created a false sense of security in the DA’s Office; (2) it
does not assist in necessary case reviews; and (3) it adds
to a cynicism and lack of trust between the DA’s Office
and the community that limits opportunities for system
improvement.

Standards for Acceptance of Petitions for
Review
Decisions about the types of cases eligible for review
(i.e., cases at the top of the funnel) reflect the CRU’s
underlying philosophy toward its role and have significant
downstream implications on the operations of the CRU.
It seems reasonable to expect that the criteria for case
acceptance for sincere CRUs will, on balance, favor the
claims of petitioners at early stages of the process, trusting
in case investigations to make clear the best result and
wanting to err on the side of catching an error rather
than excluding it. This appears to be the philosophy in
most, but not all CRUs. The Cook County (IL) CRU,
for example, accepts all petitions for review, gathering
case documents and conducting a preliminary review
and group assessment of the merits of the claim before
deciding whether a full investigation is warranted.
Most CRUs agree on the standard for a case to get
through the initial intake phase: the petitioner must
assert a claim of innocence, supported by something
testable or objectively credible in the eyes of the CRU. As
one prosecutor put it, “We don’t just review closed cases –
we need the petitioner to tell us why he’s innocent.”
Other offices used words ranging from “obvious evidence”
of innocence to “plausible” or “reasonable” evidence. “You
have to show me something,” said one prosecutor:
At the initial review, there has to be a
plausible claim. There has to essentially
be a logical nexus between the claim
and what the requested action is. If it’s
meritless on its face then it might be
summarily denied. There has to be a
reasonable nexus between the claim…
of innocence and the requested action
that they’re asking for.

The amount and types of evidence necessary to meet this
threshold can vary from office to office. Testable physical
evidence tends to be the most persuasive, though some
CRUs refuse to test items that have been previously tested,
while others will retest material that has been previously
tested if the method of testing has gotten more advanced
or sensitive and thus might yield more informative data.
In any event, summarizes one prosecutor, “[i]t needs to be
enough that I believe that at trial, with this information,
we’d probably get a different result.”
For some, the credibility of the request for review comes
in part from the source of the initial inquiry, which may
originate from the inmate, but may also come from the
inmate’s family members or counsel, other prisoners,
confidential informants, the media, and others, often
without the inmate’s involvement and sometimes even
against his or her wishes.
The source of the referral can be an important factors
in assessing the underlying credibility of a request for
a CRU review. Most CRUs believe that petitions from
an attorney have more credibility than those that come
from other sources, and many view referrals from the
media with skepticism, feeling that some other agenda
may be in play. Some prosecutors noted that claims from
family members of an inmate are often misguided, caused
by more gullible family members accepting baseless
assertions of innocence made by the perpetrator of the
crime.
A number of CRU heads specifically praised requests for
review coming from innocence organizations across the
country. The Innocence Network has shared principles
of conducting fact-based investigations into cases, and
provides a great deal of information along with their
request for review.46 As a result, requests for review made
by an innocence organization to a CRU are viewed as

46
In fact, the philosophical goal and role of the Innocence Project and Innocence Network Member Organizations is very similar to the stated purpose of a
Conviction Review Unit. To the extent there is a difference, it would seem to stem from the historical mindset of the typical attorney participant, since most lawyers
within the Innocence Network tend to be defense-oriented while employees of CRUs are obviously more experienced in the prosecutorial role. We have not attempted
to compare and contrast case acceptance policies and procedures used by Innocence Network Member Organizations with those of CRUs, though we note that the
standards and techniques for a fact-based inquiry into actual innocence should not differ based on the pro-prosecutor or pro-defense advocacy label attached to the
individual conducting the inquiry.
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more reliable and credible. In fact, one CRU stated that it
will only review cases that have been vetted in advance by
the Innocence Project in its jurisdiction.
Most CRUs find the case review process used by innocence
organizations to be informative and useful; while there
is not always agreement with the IP’s conclusions about
a specific case, the cases referred by members of the
Innocence Network generally pass the “straight face” test
and are initially reviewable:
[The excellence of the innocence
network] is something I didn’t realize
until I worked with some of ours and I
appreciate it. I think more prosecutors
should know that that’s the case. I
get letters all the time from angry
defendants or from family members
where their cases have been denied
review from innocence groups. I do
know that they screen those cases
and it does mean a lot. I don’t know
that that’s common knowledge among
prosecutors, but it should be.

CRUs differ in terms of the “degree” of innocence that
must be alleged at the initial phase to warrant further
review by the CRU. Some offices look not to an absolute
standard of “actual innocence” but rather to a more
subjective standard about whether a reasonable person
might have a reasonable doubt that the conviction is
accurate and legitimate. For those offices that have a
strict “actual innocence” view, a letter from a petitioner
that simply says that the conviction was inappropriate,
as opposed to stating that the petitioner did not commit
the crime, is likely insufficient to warrant further review.
Other CRUs adopt a more restrictive standard that is
linked to their jurisdiction’s post-conviction review rules,
based on a two-pronged belief that (a) the DA cannot
simply remove charges without judicial approval and
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(b) the judge will require a showing of proof that would
satisfy the post-conviction rules. As one prosecutor
from a jurisdiction that requires “strong indicia of actual
innocence” to conduct a more thorough case review
stated:
Ultimately there’s a criminal conviction
in place that in the case of a trial the
jury has put in place. We have to have
a legal footing that is recognized by
the state… in order to undo that
conviction. We can’t just undo that
conviction because we feel a person
may be innocent. We have to [meet]
the appropriate legal standard.

Other offices concur:
We won’t take a case where the
defense is “I’m innocent,” without
something more, something objective.
We have to abide by the Court of
Appeals standard, which is clear and
convincing, because that’s what we’re
going to go up against.

Still, not all offices adhere to a rigid legal standard. The
NCIIC, for example, says:
It was specifically on purpose when
they created the Commission, the
framers… wanted it not to be a legal
standard because the Commission
is not about technicalities and about
much of the things that people think
of with lawyers. It’s really about facts
and evidence and new evidence. And
purposefully not everyone is a lawyer
on the Commission.

Many offices have declined to create an express standard
for accepting cases, preferring instead what one called an
“I know it when I see it” approach to colorable claims
of actual innocence: “If there’s anything credible that
looks like we should review it, we review it,” said one.
“It’s a case by case decision; I’m less likely to review a case
that appears that it has been fairly litigated. This is not
supposed to be a second bite at the apple.”
CRUs without an articulated standard for case acceptance
often argue that the lack of a standard is actually a
benefit for petitioners, providing necessary freedom and
flexibility for CRUs to work in good faith to review a
wide variety of cases:
You can’t really have [strict rules] on
something like this. If… in your heart
it meets it, in your head it doesn’t,
sometimes you have to go with that.
I know it sounds terrible because we
are lawyers and we have rules and
protocols.  [This is] too dangerous an
area to have too many rules, because
rules then define each one.

On the other hand, members of the defense bar have
pointed out the opportunity for abuse of discretion (or,
more precisely, for an anti-review philosophy) to lurk
undetected behind the unstructured “I know it when I
see it” standard, and CRUs operating without externally
announced standards are subject to criticism that their
acceptance criteria are subjective and limited to the
(potentially arbitrary) perspective of the individual case
screener. Some level of definition regarding which cases
should proceed will likely be needed to convince all
stakeholders that a clear and fair process is taking place.

Legal Standards for Case Review
Newly Discovered Evidence. Drawing a precise line
between the desire to review cases where errors may have
led to the misidentification of a guilty person, and the
need to avoid simply rehearing closed criminal cases, is
a challenging and non-scientific inquiry for most CRUs.
Virtually all CRUs require some new evidence that has
not been previously disclosed to accept a case for further
review:
Some new evidence is needed so we
aren’t just rehashing cases that have
already been decided closer in time
and with more manpower.
We want to be respectful of the jury,
their verdict, and generally we’re not
going to look at a case where there’s
nothing new.

In a departure from appellate litigation requirements,
however, many CRUs take a more flexible view of what
it means for the newly discovered evidence to have been
“available” at the original trial. This is a key difference. A
sincere CRU focuses on actual innocence, unencumbered
by the availability of potentially successful due process
legal/procedural arguments that could preserve the
conviction, but which may not address the underlying
factual allegation of innocence. Thus, from the outset,
sincere CRUs will review the petition in light of what
could have been used by defense counsel, effectively
putting themselves in the role of defense counsel as part
of their validation of the merits of petitioner’s claim:
We look [at original defense counsel’s
actions] and say, “Well, you have all
this stuff and you did this poor job
of utilizing it.” If you take all of those
circumstances… and you say, “Well,
because these were exploited or not
revealed to the jury or revealed in
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such a fashion that was ineffective to
the jury,” and you look and you say,
“well, the jury’s fact-finding process
was so corrupted by that that you can’t
consider that verdict or you can’t have
confidence in that verdict,” therefore it
should be a nullity.

One way the balancing can be done is by sidestepping the
question of whether “newly discovered evidence” is needed
at all to justify CRU review. Rather than discussing when
the evidence was discovered, for example, the NCIIC
can hear cases with “[c]redible, verifiable evidence of the
applicant’s innocence” even if that evidence was previously
available, so long as the evidence was not previously heard
in court.
Charging Errors. Another question for CRUs is whether
they will review cases in which the petitioner acknowledges
a role in the events in question, but argues that the wrong
assessment of criminal accountability was reached. Most
CRUs view the reassessment of certain charges to be a
usurpation of the role of the original trier of fact. Those
original participants made their own assessments of
appropriate assessments of guilt, innocence, and charges,
and most CRUs are hesitant to circumvent the will of a
jury or a judge-approved plea bargain.
We look for cases where it’s the
wrong person, where the petitioner
wasn’t even there and has a claim
focused on absolute vindication. The
only other kind of vindication is when
there wasn’t a crime committed.

One CRU in our survey, however, consciously reviews
cases for “count by count” innocence, meaning that the
Unit will agree to vacate a single charge that is inaccurate
even if other charges related to the same set of facts were
accurately charged and should be sustained. For example,
a woman convicted of armed robbery in a situation where
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she was unarmed and the facts of the case did not allege
robbery would be eligible for review in such a scenario,
even if the woman could have been convicted of a lesser
offense for her conduct in the situation.

Procedural vs. Substantive Case Reviews
The criteria for when a CRU will conduct a thorough
case investigation varies across different CRUs. Not
surprisingly, the more restrictive a CRU is in agreeing to
investigate cases, the more the unit will be viewed as a
CRINO by external observers. One CRU in our survey,
for example, has unpublished criteria refusing cases where
any of the following questions is answered in the negative:
•

Is there a “qualifying conviction” (for specific
violent felonies)?

•

Is the defendant still incarcerated?

•

Is the primary defense not predicated on
defendant’s factual involvement (e.g., not guilty
by reason of insanity or another voluntary
affirmative defense)?

•

Did the inmate maintain his innocence
continually throughout all proceedings?

•

Is identity an issue in the case?

•

Is there valid, testable biological evidence?

•

Has the biological evidence not previously
been tested in the modern era of DNA testing?

•

Would a finding excluding the inmate as the
source of DNA be material to the guilty party?

•

Did the inmate decline or not want to
participate?

Such restrictions on cases available for review seem more
focused on excluding cases than on sincerely identifying
and addressing cases where errors have occurred. Refusing
to review cases where actual innocence is alleged because
the sentence has been completed, or where an individual
has plead guilty to the crime, for example, convey a focus

on procedural form over the substance of actual innocence.
While seizing upon procedural grounds may be necessary
for the CRU to prioritize limited resources, such a lack of
resources for the review of cases with plausible claims of
actual innocence is, of course, its own problem.
Other offices, including the NCIIC, have established
more explicit criteria for case acceptance:47
•

The conviction must be for a felony imposed in
a North Carolina state court;

•

The applicant must be a living person;

•

The applicant must be claiming complete
factual innocence for any criminal
responsibility for the crime;

•

Credible, verifiable evidence of the applicant’s
innocence must exist;

•

The basis of petitioner’s claim must not have
been previously heard at trial or in a postconviction hearing;

•

The applicant must sign an agreement in
which he waives his procedural safeguards
and privileges, agrees to cooperate with
the Commission, and agrees to provide full
disclosure regarding all inquiry requirements of
the Commission.48

While different jurisdictions may draw different lines,
these requirements make clear to all that the NCIIC
is an agency dedicated to hearing substantial claims
of complete factual innocence not previously heard in
a North Carolina court. While some of the NCIIC’s
requirements, most notably the requirement for petitioner
to waive all procedural safeguards, are not embraced by all
CRUs, this core philosophy is shared by the majority of
jurisdictions with CRUs.

47

N.C. G.S. 15A-1460(1)

48

N.C. G.S. §15A-1467.

Cases Resolved by Guilty Plea
Another instance where CRUs may prize form above
substance is in the decision not to accept cases originally
resolved by a guilty plea. There is a wealth of scientific
literature, as well as common sense reasoning, indicating
that individuals sometimes plead guilty to crimes they
have not committed, for rational and irrational reasons.
Some pleas are knowing and free, while others may be
given under compulsion or trickery – but there can be
no doubt that pleading guilty to a crime and actually
committing the crime are not the same thing. Rejecting
petitions for innocence in cases resolved by guilty plea
is particularly ill-advised in cases where DNA or other
scientific evidence is available for testing that could (a)
conclusively exclude the petitioner and/or (b) conclusively
identify one or more participants in the underlying crime.
Recognizing that there is a difference between a formal
admission of guilt to a court and an actual admission “in
one’s heart” about committing the crime charged, most
CRUs are willing to review cases in which the petitioner
had entered a guilty plea. Those who use the guilty plea
as a tool to exclude cases from the CRU typically do
so as a way to prioritize scarce case review resources,
rather than attempting to justify the procedural rejection
of such cases on grounds of factual accuracy. Others,
however, view a guilty plea as a knowing decision of the
petitioner to “cut a deal” during the adjudication of the
underlying case, and are loath to revisit that agreement.
Accordingly, some CRUs require a “heightened showing”
of innocence before agreeing to review guilty pleas. The
Manhattan DA’s policy, for example, “will agree to DNA
testing in cases in which the results will be informative
as to any question strongly related to the issue of guilt or
innocence,” while acknowledging that “claims made on
behalf of defendants who pleaded guilty… will require a
higher standard to garner [CRU] review.”49

49
New York County DA’s Office, “Post-Conviction Case Review and Re-Investigation of Cases.” These requirements are similar to those of the Innocence Project at
Cardozo Law School in New York, NY. “The Innocence Project represents clients seeking post-conviction DNA testing to prove their innocence. We also consult on
a number of cases on appeal in which the defendant is represented by primary counsel and we provide information and background on DNA testing litigation.” http://
www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/exonerating-the-innocent, accessed August 24, 2015.
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Figure 10. CIUs that Accept Cases
Originally Resolved by Guilty Plea.
No,
1

Yes,
19

The precise nature of this “heightened showing” varies
from office to office. One prosecutor noted that a
compelling factor in deciding whether to pursue a case
resolved by a guilty plea was the acceptance of a sentence
far lower than the crime charged would otherwise have
been. This, to her, suggested that the guilty plea was a
strategic move by defendant as opposed to one driven by
prosecutorial coercion. Other prosecutors might say that
such a plea means that the petitioner got the benefit of his
bargain, and there is no further need to review the case,
while defense attorneys point out that to the extent the
question of innocence and guilt is affected at all by this
assessment of the plea bargain, a large disparity between
crimes charged and the crimes to which the petitioner
plead might suggest that the prosecutor’s claims were
weak and/or outlandish to begin with.
Other offices (e.g., the NCIIC) ignore the question of
whether the plea deal was coercive, and simply require
a higher standard of evidence if the petitioner’s position
that he is innocent has ever wavered. The NCIIC requires
credible, verifiable evidence of innocence to outweigh a
guilty plea and initiate an investigation. In addition, cases
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decided originally by a guilty plea can only move from
the Commission to a court hearing upon the unanimous
agreement of the Commission members, whereas cases
with other resolutions can advance to a hearing on a
majority vote.
If the goal is to find cases of actual innocence and address
them, the existence of a guilty plea should not bar the
case from review. At the same time, a CRU looking to
maximize efficiency and impact is entitled to understand
why someone who at one time stood before a judge and
admitted his or her participation in a crime is now offering
a different, and far more self-interested statement of the
case.

Cases Alleging Both Factual Innocence and
Due Process Violations.
CRUs embracing a “totality of the circumstances” standard
in assessing factual innocence must often evaluate claims
that are justified by, or overlap with, claims of violations of
due process. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim, for
example, does not necessarily incorporate a claim of actual
innocence, though the two are often interconnected. Due
process claims are also the vehicle for discussing a claim
of factual innocence in convictions based on scientific
testimony where the scientific literature has evolved
since the underlying conviction (e.g., arson, shaken baby
syndrome, bite mark or hair follicle comparisons). In
cases like these, it has not been uncommon for appellate
attorneys within DA’s Offices to point to one or more
scientific papers published prior to the trial. Such papers,
whether or not they were actually known to petitioner’s
defense counsel (or, for that matter to the prosecutors) at
the time of trial, can be used to argue against the admission
of any new fire science knowledge on the grounds that it
could have been used by defense counsel at trial. This is
a perfectly legitimate legal defense of the conviction, but
it is not an independent, fact-based assessment of actual
innocence.50

50
Of course, the claim that science has evolved over time does not automatically mean that a fact-based assessment would find the individual innocent either; there
may well be other fact-based indicia of guilt. The point is merely to showcase the difference between a fact-based analysis and a legitimate defense based on legal
grounds.

Figure 11. Overlap of Actual Innocence
and Due Process Claims.
Substance of Claims

Actual
Innocence

Due
Process

IAC, Brady, Junk Science, etc. to
Support Actual Innocence Claims
Consider an arson case submitted to a CRU. The petitioner
for review may argue actual innocence (“I did not set the
fire”), or may claim that forensic arguments supporting
his innocence should have been presented in his defense,
and the absence of those arguments is evidence of a viable
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Or he may not
claim innocence, instead remaining silent on the point
and asserting solely the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. Similar situations arise in other due process claims,
such as illegal search/seizure, police or prosecutorial
misconduct, etc.
CRUs vary in their reactions to these three types of
claims. More restrictive CRUs simply refer the latter two
categories – what we will call here due process claims –
to the standard post-conviction appellate review process,
feeling that the claims are fundamentally legal in nature
and are not true claims of actual innocence. More often,
however, sincere CRUs are willing to review cases that
implicate due process concerns, so long as the underlying
allegation continues to be based upon a claim of actual

innocence. This is based in part on the recognition that
a judicial declaration of actual innocence may actually be
harder to secure than a judicial declaration of a procedural
violation that achieves the higher purpose of vacating the
conviction:
In a perfect world what we are
searching for is some objectively, some
objective evidence of innocence.   But
if you can’t reach the actual innocence
legal standard, it’s where you see
those kind of “default” due process
standards, [then] that’s where you get
the new trial.  Then we just dismiss it.
You may not get that actual innocence
binding effect because we can’t reach
that standard, but we will find a way
to get relief on some other ground.
[In our jurisdiction,] it’s a lot easier
to get relief on a due process ground
than it is actual innocence because the
standard is higher.

Figure 12. Standard for Review: Due
Process Claims (n=20)

26%
47%

26%

¢ Same as Habeas
¢ Broader than Habeas
¢  No Due Process Claims
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The assessment of how to address primarily legal claims
that may bear on innocence is an important and emerging
area for most CRUs:

If the goal is the truth, if the defense attorney could
have figured it out and didn’t, I’m not sure the defendant
should have to pay for that.

There’s two classes of cases. One is
there’s a case where there’s actual
innocence, where there’s evidence
that you have the wrong person. That’s
obviously the worst case scenario. The
second type of case is where there’s
new evidence… or new information
that has come forward that may or may
not show that this person is innocent
or we may never know. I think the
days of DNA coming back saying you
have the wrong person, those days are
over. From now on we’re going to see
cases where it’s not going to be that
black and white. That’s fine, it doesn’t
mean we shouldn’t look at these cases.
In fact, we should look at them more
because these are cases where there’s

At the same time, many offices are unwilling to reverse
a conviction that was otherwise fairly attained simply
because the defense attorney may not have been operating
at the height of the profession:

a lot more to look at.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims for
Factual Innocence.
Most CRUs deploy a slightly different standard for
handling blended actual innocence/due process claims
based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims reviewed
by CRUs. The real question for the CRU is whether legal
standards of “acceptable” defense ineptitude should be
used to justify not investigating an otherwise credible
claim of innocence:
We’re looking at new evidence, and
we’re trying to figure out, well did
the defense attorney know about it
and choose not to present it, or did
they not even know about it? And so
it helps us understand why it wasn’t
presented and hence its credibility and
reliability.
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If I’m looking at a case and I’m reading
a transcript and like, oh my gosh.
This guy fell asleep at the wheel… it
certainly plays in but I’m not going to
be in a position where I’m going to be
conceding or rolling over on ineffective
assistance. Unless the claim is right, I’m
going to try to find something else.

Ultimately, CRUs viewed as sincere will be willing
to review due process claims using a “totality of the
circumstances” standard for case review, focusing on what
actually happened to end in a just result. This is true even
if, or perhaps especially if, a rigid judicial process might
have led to a different result.

“Conviction Integrity” and Cases That Lack
Conclusive Evidence of Guilt.
Perhaps the truest measure distinguishing a sincere
CRU from a CRINO is its approach to cases that
lack both conclusive evidence of guilt, and clear-cut
evidence of innocence. In such cases, the CRU finds
itself in an uncomfortable middle ground, conceding
that the conviction lacks strength and may not add up
to conclusive guilt, but recognizing that the facts are far
from establishing actual innocence. In such a situation,
should the CRU move to vacate the conviction?
Many CRUs refused to comment on such a scenario in
the absence of case specifics, but most agreed on two
important points: first, that it is possible to lose faith in

a conviction’s accuracy without being convinced of an
individual’s innocence; and second, that in such instances,
the appropriate action for the CRU is to seek to vacate
the conviction and work with petitioner or petitioner’s
counsel to renegotiate, or potentially retry the case.
Cases where… you’re going to have
new evidence that may not point to
actual innocence, but there’s so many
problems with the conviction. I guess
the best way to put it is I don’t want to
put the good name of my office on that
conviction. We may agree to just say
look, we’re not necessarily saying this
person’s innocent, but we’re going to
set aside the conviction in the interest
of justice because X,Y, and Z.
As we look in the future, we’re not
going to necessarily see those black
and white “oh my gosh we thought
it was him, but it was actually him”
[cases]. It’s going to be a lot more
muddy than that, but that doesn’t
mean that we shouldn’t act. If there’s
a case where it’s not black and white
and this person’s actually innocent, but
the water’s so muddy so to speak that
we wouldn’t want to put our name on
that case, we would still act.

A prosecutor from another large CRU agrees:
Other cases are not necessarily going
to get to that actual innocence finally,
but you’ve now learned enough that
it just undermines your confidence in
the outcome. What happens in those
cases, most of the time, you may not
get an actual innocence finding, but
relief is going to be granted and so the

case is going to come back for retrial
and it’s going to get dismissed because
nobody wants to touch it with a 10foot pole.

Jackie Lacey, District Attorney for Los Angeles County,
espoused a similar view during her announcement of the
Los Angeles CRU, suggesting the potential emergence of
this view as a majority view: “[i]f the committee decides
the office has lost faith in the conviction, my office will
seek to have the conviction vacated.”
The decision of when to dismiss all charges and when
to retry the petitioner is challenging, and is made on a
potentially confusing, case-by-case basis:
Sometimes, we are sorry, we just don’t
have the answers. We are going to
have old cases, old memories, old files,
different times, different everything.
It’s not as easy as you think to say, this
person is innocent. It’s so difficult.
Let’s say we’ve got some pretty
strong evidence that this person is
entitled to a new trial, just based on
retesting; we retested the evidence
and… it’s enough reasonable doubt
that… this [conviction] should have
been prevented. It’s newly discovered
and should have been presented at
trial, because it could be outcomedeterminative. That’s when we send
back for a new trial. We can’t tell. It’s
not clear enough for us to say total
vindication, but it’s clear enough for us
to say, it’s entitled to a trial… [But] in
some cases, we looked at it and said
it was just so screwed up that justice
demands we release them.  
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It is reasonable to expect that prosecutors and defense
attorneys may not agree on the appropriate resolution
to be reached in cases where neither guilt nor innocence
has been proven conclusively. It is precisely for this
reason that these cases are the true marks of “conviction
integrity.” CRU heads and DAs should know that the
way in which they assess and act upon these cases will be
a deciding factor in how their CRU, and their approach
to conviction integrity is ultimately judged by thoughtful
observers. A CRINO will be seen in offices that reflexively
uphold convictions in all but the most extreme cases of
innocence, while a sincere CRU will examine the case
with fresh eyes, considering (a) the likelihood of guilt and
(b) the likely sentence for the case if tried today along
with (c) the sentence already served by the convicted
individual, before deciding upon the best course of
action, and communicating his or her decision to defense
counsel along with its rationale. Such decision-making
need not result in a decision to vacate the conviction but
must treat the defendant as part of the very community
the prosecutor is trying to protect.

Collaborative Case Review
CRUs have reached widely varying conclusions about
whether to include petitioner or petitioner’s counsel in
the conduct of a case review. On one extreme are the
jurisdictions that simply take a petition and conduct an
internal investigation, reach a conclusion, and inform
petitioner of the result. On the other, a few CRUs will
conduct joint witness interviews with petitioner’s counsel
under certain circumstances. Most CRUs fall somewhere
between these two extremes.
Criminal prosecutions are inherently adversarial, and the
collaborative navigation of a post-conviction review is
tricky, particularly while the petitioner to the CRU has
ongoing appeals. Given this, it is no surprise that a CRU

Conviction
Review
Units:
A National
Perspective
48

might give the petitioner no role other than initiating a
request for the CRU’s review. As one CRU head put it:
We would absolutely follow the rules
of discovery. [Petitioners] want more
of a collaborative effort. I’m not so
sure we’re ready for that. And I’m not
so sure that that’s necessarily the best
way to go.

Offices that have not embraced petitioner’s participation
in the CRU’s review of the case point out that the role
of investigating a case to determine actual innocence
is no different than what prosecutors typically do at
the start of criminal cases, and the CRU can conduct
its investigation in the same way. If so, it is no more
necessary to engage external participation or petitioner’s
input than it would be to engage external participation
during the investigational phase of any other case, and
there can be objectivity without the specific addition of
a defense-oriented voice. These CRUs often also point
out that engaging outsiders in the process might waive
privileges, etc. that could affect pending appeals:
[Our] process of review was a
confidential one, in which [the CRU]
did not share information with
anyone but initiated the gathering of
information. In particular, [the CRU]
did not reach out to prosecutors [of
the underlying cases], because they did
not want to risk tainting any pending
appeals. Few defense attorneys were
interested or involved; most had
moved on to other cases and didn’t
even share information about their
former clients’ cases.

More flexible CRUs will permit petitioner’s counsel to
act as a participant in the case investigation, since counsel
can help locate, interview, and/or discuss issues around
evidence presented by potential witnesses or items of
evidence:
[W]hen we do open a full
investigation… what we’re trying to
do is establish a proper investigation
where they tell us what they have or
we tell them what we have. If they
are part of it, everything that we
have, we will do interviews jointly
with them. We will give them the
substance of whatever interview that
we’ve done. We will disclose to them
all of the paper that we’re able to
garner to make comparisons to see
whether trial counsel got all the same
paperwork that we now have in our
possession. We are obligated if we find
anything that is exculpatory in nature
during our investigations to report it
immediately to the court and we will
give it to them simultaneously.

Other CRUs are willing to hear from the petitioner, but
do not allow an external voice in the CRU’s deliberations
or assessments of the case. For example, in both New York
County and Middlesex County (MA), petitioner’s counsel
is invited to present to the CRU’s investigation team,
and petitioner’s communication with the investigators is
encouraged throughout the process. The petitioner may
assist the investigation team in responding to follow-up
questions from that committee and may present multiple
times to the review committee. Their review committees,
however, are made up entirely of internal members of
the DA’s Office and make the final recommendation for
action by the DA.

The willingness to include external participants in the
case review is not limited to petitioner or petitioner’s
counsel. It extends also to other agencies that may have
information relevant to the CRU’s investigation. CRUs
all agree that they would consult external agencies or
individuals as necessary to get information, though most
described the typical response as standoffish at best from
the other agencies, who “hate” the process and see little
potential upside in the time investment necessary to help
investigate a possible error.
Many CRUs will conduct their own independent
investigation but will confer with petitioner or counsel
before making a formal recommendation to the DA or an
external panel. This helps inform the CRU with regard to
the identification, location, and interpretation of pieces
of evidence into the creation of an accurate and nuanced
narrative of the case.
Another benefit seen by CRUs that involve petitioner’s
counsel in investigations is a reduction of defense counsel
impulses to tell petitioner’s story to the media. And any
concern that an adversarial “mini-trial” might result
if petitioner’s counsel is involved seems to be largely
unfulfilled in practice:
That’s something that I changed my
mind on that. I went 180 [degrees].
Initially I had determined that I wasn’t
going to do that just because I thought
I’d be opening up the flood gates. All
these attorneys coming in and putting
on mini-trials, but that hasn’t happened.
We’ve done it a couple of times where
I think it’s actually been healthy. I’m
certainly open to that. If it got to the
point where it was becoming… The
people were coming in putting on mini
trials, then we’d have to revisit it. Right
now, it seems to work well so I’m open
to doing that.
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CRU Requirements for Waiver of Petitioner’s
Rights Under Appeal
Tolling Agreements. Whether one views the CRU’s
investigative role as collaborative or independent, it would
be counterintuitive and counterproductive for a CRU
review to penalize the legitimate claims of a petitioner
in any way. Accordingly, the CRU’s case review should
be separate and apart from any ongoing habeas petition
activities, and CRUs should be willing to appear before
the appropriate courts of record and request a tolling
order from the judge that will ensure that the petitioner’s
participation in the CRU process will not jeopardize
any other rights he or she might have in a habeas/postconviction review process.
Attorney-Client Privilege. One of the more contentious
policies adopted by a small group of CRUs (see Figure
13) is the requirement that petitioner waive his or her
attorney/client privilege as a prerequisite to CRU review.

Figure 13: Does CRU Require Defense
Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege?
(n=19)
11%

89%

¢  Yes         ¢  No
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Offices requiring a waiver see a fundamental fairness
directed to ascertaining the truth that corresponds well to
the stated goal of the CRU, since the waiver is requested
in the service of allowing the CRU investigators to speak
to anyone, including petitioner’s attorneys, who can help
in the search for the truth – which may be different than
a search to prove the petitioner’s innocence. One CRU
head whose jurisdiction requires a waiver of attorney/
client privilege explained their position this way:
We [ask for] a waiver to make it easier
for us to look into it, because it would
be unlikely that a trial defense attorney
would talk to us unless the attorneyclient privilege is waived.  The waiver
is not for the purpose of investigating
more crimes. The purpose is to help
us look into the claim presented by
that person. So it’s a combination.
I think it works well… [to get] a
notarized document from [petitioner]
consenting to the waiver of privilege.”

Other offices frame the question as one of equality and
objectivity. If prosecutors are going to dedicate resources
to a fact-based investigation of a closed conviction, and if
they are required to share all exculpatory information, the
logic goes, it is reasonable to ensure that the petitioner is
operating in good faith too, and is not hiding inculpatory
information behind attorney/client privilege:
I think if we’re truly undertaking a fact
finding effort to find out the truth
about something, it should be open on
both sides. And I know the law doesn’t
mandate that, but I would expect that
sort of fairness on the other side. I
would hope that somebody would
not be bringing me a particular piece
of evidence to try to suggest that
somebody is innocent but then hiding
other evidence.

Not surprisingly, requiring a petitioner claiming actual
innocence to waive a constitutional protection as an entry
fee for a factual review of his case does not please defense
counsel, who are hesitant to waive privilege beyond the
CRU review and who worry that the petitioners’ waiver
might lead to the disclosure of incriminatory information
regarding other, unrelated criminal acts.
These concerns are valid, and some CRUs have shown a
willingness to meet defense counsel halfway on the issue.
The protocols of Oneida County (NY), for example, state:
Where the need arises, a defendant
may be required by the Committee
to waive attorney/client privilege
in writing in order that the defense
attorney(s) who originally represented
the defendant may be interviewed as
to any admissions or other disclosures
made by the defendant during the
pendency of the original case. Failure
of a defendant to consent to such a
waiver may result in a discontinuation
of the re-investigation where such
information is reasonably necessary to
resolve the claim.

With this language, Oneida effectively limits the extent
of the waiver to specific instances where it may be useful
to the petitioner’s case review.
Other offices take a more aggressive approach.
The NCIIC, for example, requires “[t]he waiver of
procedural safeguards and privileges… for all matters
relating to the claimant’s innocence claim,” though the
Commission notes that petitioner’s waiver “does not
create an affirmative duty on the part of the attorney to
disclose.” The situation is more pronounced when the full
Commission meets to review a recommendation from the
investigators:

The Commission may compel the
testimony of any witness. If a witness
asserts his or her privilege against selfincrimination in a proceeding under
this Article, the Commission chair…
may order the witness to testify or
produce other information if the chair
first determines that the witness’s
testimony will likely be material to
reach a correct factual determination
in the case at hand.

This language may be helpful in getting information
from witnesses to the underlying case, though it can
easily run afoul of petitioner’s 5th Amendment rights.
On the other hand, the NCIIC’s scope is limited only
to the case at hand and is not intended to punish the
petitioner in other (or previous) settings. It includes a
limited grant of immunity for the individual taking part
in the Commission’s proceedings:
The order shall prevent a prosecutor
from using the compelled testimony,
or evidence derived therefrom, to
prosecute the witness for previous
false statements made under oath
by the witness in prior proceedings.
Once granted, the immunity shall apply
throughout all proceedings conducted
pursuant to this Article.

A third approach, embraced by multiple CRUs, is to
request but not require a waiver of attorney/client
privilege, while noting that the petitioner’s refusal to
waive the privilege may be viewed by the CRU as a
negative factor when reviewing petitioner’s case for actual
innocence.
Whatever the rationale, requiring a waiver of attorney/
client privilege is likely to have a chilling effect on the
willingness of some petitioners to engage with the CRU.
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Defense attorneys in jurisdictions requiring the waivers
will often actively counsel potential petitioners not to
apply to their CRUs, preferring post-conviction appeals
to the waiver. Thus, the practical effect of requiring
petitioners to waive attorney/client privilege as a
condition of conducting a case review is to return to the
adversarial system, undercutting the value of the CRU as
a driver towards a collaborative search for truth.

Petitioner/CRU Collaboration Agreements
Given the new challenges created – for all parties – by the
extrajudicial CRU investigatory process, some CRUs have
begun experimenting with collaborative confidentiality
agreements that outline the roles and limitations of various
stakeholders in the CRU process. Such agreements could
address areas of potential conflict (such as the waiver
of privilege described above) and provide other mutual
assurances of good faith that can enhance the CRU
process. For example, some offices use written agreements
with defense counsel to restrict the ability of either party
to discuss the case with CRU investigators or the media
or other external participants. Such agreements have
been considered by only a few offices to date, but they are
promising:
I have had cases where the defense
attorney would call and ask me to
look at a case. I’d agree to look at it
and at the same time he would call the
newspaper who would then write an
article about our review and put it on
the front page of the paper. They have
a victim calling me screaming what’s
going on, before I’ve even had a chance
to look at the case. That’s a problem. I
think the [confidentiality agreement] is
a better way to handle it.

Confidentiality agreements are not necessarily without
their concerns in a CRU context. Some DAs worry that

Conviction
Review
Units:
A National
Perspective
52

a written contract between the parties on the conduct
of a CRU investigation simply creates a new obligation
between the DA’s Office and the petitioner that could
conceivably lead to a new course of action, this time
in civil court, between the parties. On the other side,
defense counsel may react poorly when their request for
moral justice and an honest case review is greeted by a
legal document seeking to put further limitations on
their ability to advocate for their client. Done properly,
however, collaboration agreements may act to provide the
parties with a framework for building a mutual trust that
allows the case review to flourish, to the benefit of all.
The CRU that has given the most thought to the use of
confidentiality agreements with petitioner’s counsel is the
Kings County (NY) District Attorney’s Office, which
covers Brooklyn. Like other offices, the Brooklyn CRU
is cognizant of the potential imbalance that can result in
an investigation when petitioner refuses to allow the CRU
to speak with his original defense counsel. At the same
time, the CRU does not believe that it is appropriate to
ask a petitioner who is claiming actual innocence to waive
constitutional protections as an “entry fee” to search for
the truth.
Their solution is a thoughtful example of the benefit of
flexibility that the CRU enables. Rather than adopt a strict
rule requiring waiver of privilege, or allowing a withholding
of privilege to interfere with a full investigation where
warranted, Brooklyn presents a “cooperation agreement”
to the petitioner as a choice:
When we do open a full investigation…
we seek a cooperative agreement with
defense counsel.That includes a limited
waiver as to the defendant’s privilege
with their former attorneys, which they
have no reason not to sign – particularly
if they’re accusing their former defense
attorney of misconduct… What we’re

trying to do is establish a proper
investigation where they tell us what
they have or we tell them what we
have. Now, they don’t have to enter
into that. If they don’t enter into that,
it doesn’t mean that we’re not going
to do a full investigation on the case.
It just means that they won’t be part
of it… If they are part of it, everything
that we have, we will do interviews
jointly with them. We will give them
the substance of whatever interview
that we’ve done. We will disclose to
them all of the paper that we’re able
to garner to make comparisons to see
whether trial counsel got all the same
paperwork that we now have in our
possession.  We are obligated if we find
anything that is exculpatory in nature
during our investigations to report it
immediately to the court and we will
give it to them simultaneously. There’s
all kinds of advantages for them to do
that. We hope that everybody plays
by the rules. We tell them that if they
withhold things or if they go… to
the press about the progress of our
investigation, that all bets are off and
then they’re out, but we want it to be
as open as we can with them and let
them know every stage of the game.
One caveat to that is, and it happens
on occasion, that we won’t share
with them things that will endanger
a particular individual’s life. That
situation does arise on occasion, but
for all other purposes, we want them
to be a partner in the investigation as
opposed to an adversary.

The conditional cooperative agreement model used
in Brooklyn underscores the advantages to both sides
of articulating a relationship structure that might feel
unfamiliar to two historically adversarial parties. The
CRU gets additional information to aid in its totality
of the circumstances review, as well as freedom from
headline-driven advocacy and media involvement. On
the other side, the petitioner benefits from improved
and active participation in the investigation, which may
provide a material benefit to the search, and receives any
investigational information generated for use in a later
appeals process, if necessary.

Training for CRU Personnel
Most CRUs handle the re-investigation of cases in the
same way that they handle the investigation of cases preindictment. The CRU appoints a lead prosecutor to direct
the investigation and provides access to one or more
investigators to assist with the process. A CRU case review
can be meaningfully different from a pre-indictment or
pre-trial case investigation, however. First, cases under
CRU review are inherently cases where errors are being
alleged. Thus, it is useful for the individuals participating
in the case review to be familiar with the types of errors
that have been known to occur in criminal cases, and to
receive training on the situations in which those errors
have occurred, to help them identify potential “weak
spots” in the underlying case that might have contributed
to a mistaken finding of guilt.
A second difference between a case review conducted
by a CRU and an open case investigation is one of
contemporaneousness. The CRU review can be thought
of as the inverse of a “cold case,” often occurring years,
and perhaps even decades after conviction. Thus, an
essential preliminary hurdle of CRU investigations is the
identification and location of all case-related information,
including documents, potential witnesses, biological

Conviction
Review
Units:
A National
Perspective
53

materials or information, etc. Interestingly, it is the nonprosecutorial NCIIC that sees this most clearly:
We have a whole process by which we
ask an agency to search now. That has
developed over time. We begin with
asking them to search themselves, and
having them report back the details
of the search. And along with that, we
need their evidence storage policies
and we need to know it they have any
unaccounted-for evidence, and that’s
what we’re really looking for.  So if an
agency, for example, searches and we
can see how their evidence is stored
and how their evidence logs are, (and
we might tour the facility to find that
out), and they have no unaccountedfor evidence, then we have to trust
that search. But if they search and then
we find out that they have evidence
that’s just unaccounted for, you know,
unlabeled boxes, or things that they
don’t know where they are, or missing
evidence, then we’re going to have
to search ourselves. So we’re asking
them to do affidavits throughout that
process… If they can’t give us complete
confirmation of all of those things, we’ll
ask them to go back. We start with
them, but if they ultimately can’t do
that, we’re going to do our request to
search ourselves. But we’re going to do
it very nicely, and we’re going to send
them proposed procedures to search,
work with them on how that want
that to be changed or how they want
that to be done.  Whoever they want
to be there with us. If they don’t want
us touching evidence… All of those
things, we’ll iron out those proposed
procedures with them.
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Gathering such information can be quite challenging,
and training its members on techniques to locate the
information has had a substantial impact on many
investigations:
The [NCIIC] has successfully located
physical evidence and/or files in 18
cases when previous efforts by other
agencies had resulted in conclusions
that the evidence or files had been
destroyed or lost. In some of those
cases, the prior searches had been
court ordered with findings of fact
made regarding the missing evidence.
In 2014, the Commission successfully
located missing evidence in four
cases. Of those cases, two resulted
in exonerations, one is pending as a
federal habeas corpus motion, and
another case continues to be actively
investigated.

While several of the employees of the NCIIC have
graduated from law school, none has prosecutorial or
investigational experience, suggesting that the skills
necessary to fully investigate CRU cases are (a) trainable
and (b) not typically taught by DA’s Offices to the
attorneys participating in CRU reviews. Providing the
training necessary to ensure that a person knowledgeable
about the precise type of investigation that is necessary
in a CRU setting is something that each CRU should
consider for every investigation.
None of the CRUs we spoke to have a formal
training program to assist prosecutors or investigators
participating in the CRU with the conduct of case
reviews. This information would likely be helpful for all
attorneys within an office, but it should be mandatory for
individuals involved in CRU case reviews.

Revisiting “Completed” CRU Reviews
Another area of flexibility in CRUs is the ability to “reopen”
a CRU case that the Unit has previously reviewed. Those
CRUs that have considered the question are uniform that
a decision not to proceed with a specific petition is not a
one-time, permanent refusal “with prejudice” that bars a
future review. Rather, rejection places the petition into a
“parking lot” of sorts. No additional work is anticipated
by the CRU, but if at any later date the petitioner were to
gather additional evidence sufficient to meet the CRU’s
investigational standard, the petition could be reopened.
Some CRUs mentioned a slight caveat to this policy,
designed to minimize repeated requests for unproductive
additional reviews: while the Unit’s standard for its first
acceptance of the case for review is very broad, permitting
the review of facts known but not used by petitioner’s
counsel at the time of trial, subsequent reviews would
require a more traditional definition of “newly discovered”
that requires evidence not previously known to the
petitioner as of the time of the most recent CRU review.
So long as the totality of the circumstances standard is
employed by the CRU, such a rule should not materially
damage a good faith petitioner.

CRUs and Forensic Science
For the most part, questions regarding the scientific
testing of biological or other evidence in a CRU context
are handled in the same manner as cases outside the
CRU. Prosecutors will test evidence that they feel will
conclusively resolve questions of guilt or innocence,
while defense attorneys and petitioners often seek to
test much more broadly. In addition, the parties often
disagree about the probative value of the evidence yielded
by one test or another. Budget and utilization constraints
are as real in the CRU setting as in day-to-day practice,
making policies for the use of forensic science in CRU
investigations a very subjective one for the CRU as well
as for the petitioner.

Sincere CRUs are typically willing to test evidence if (a)
the evidence has been newly discovered; (b) the evidence
has not previously been tested; and/or (c) the testing
technique proposed is a material advance in specificity
or sensitivity to prior testing methods used. Beyond that,
whether and how to test specific pieces of evidence is a
more subjective inquiry. Some CRUs are very willing to
conduct tests requested by the petitioner:
I know there’s financial concerns there
and the people out at the crime lab
probably don’t like me, but my position
is if somebody wants to have something
tested or re-tested, we’re going to do
it. We have done [the testing] on every
single occasion because it’s either going
to tell you nothing, or it’ll confirm the
conviction, or God forbid it tells you
you have the wrong person. Either way,
you want to know.

Another CRU leader also explained why the office might
not test forensic evidence:
The only time we don’t test is (a) there
is nothing to test. If the evidence that
is destroyed, sorry we can’t test it.
We’d love to, we can’t. Or (b) where
it’s really not giving you this positive,
like in a rape allegation where he didn’t
actually physically penetrate her, he
just held her wrist. He’s still guilty of
rape. He doesn’t like that because he
didn’t do it, if you will. Well, okay, I’m
not going to do DNA testing. There
is nothing to test that’s going to be
probative. We are going to object only
in situations like that. Otherwise, we
are testing.
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In another example of the potential benefit from involving
external participants, at least one CRU has a process in
place that allows its investigators to discuss the benefits
of various tests with an independent (i.e., external)
forensic expert. If the expert suggests that testing would
be valuable, then the CRU approves the test.
Several offices take an economically pragmatic view: the
DA’s Office will pay for testing that meets the prosecutor’s
bar of bearing on innocence, and it permits additional
testing at the request of the petitioner, at petitioner’s
expense. As one prosecutor succinctly stated, “I’ll let the
defendant test anything he/she wants, if he pays for it.”

Allegations of Prosecutorial or Law
Enforcement Misconduct
One concern often raised in the context of a CRU
investigation is whether allegations of official misconduct
will be reviewed fairly and in good faith by the DA’s
Office. It is difficult to know whether the “epidemic of
Brady violations” seen by some observers of the criminal
justice system51 is caused by an increase in prosecutorial
misconduct, an increase in allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct, or an improvement in our ability to detect
such violations. It is also difficult to tell in many contexts
whether the failure of the prosecution to turn over
exculpatory evidence is a failure of record-keeping, a
failure of interpretation of the subjective “materiality”
standard, or a deliberate attempt to gain advantage in a
criminal case, though all of these situations are currently
lumped together as “prosecutorial misconduct.”
Cases progressing through the post-conviction appeals
process often involve newly discovered evidence, and
the defense by necessity focuses on what was “known” by
police or prosecutors during the underlying investigation
and prosecution.52 Thus, it is predictable that a CRU will
be confronted with questions and allegations regarding the
actions of the original investigator(s) and prosecutor(s).
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DAs and CRU leaders can be sure that petitioners and
the defense bar, as well as the media, will watch carefully
to see how such situations are handled, and will use these
situations as a benchmark for the independence and
transparency of the CRU and the Office as a whole.
While very few CRUs admitted to identifying an
intentional case of prosecutorial misconduct in any of
their investigations to date, all were uniform in how
they proposed to handle such an issue. The CRU would
refer information about the potential misconduct to an
appropriate official as set forth by the DA’s policies on
misconduct, and would continue its fact-based review of
the case in question. None, however, have a written policy
supporting this process, or any process for handling cases
involving official misconduct.53
Despite broad public skepticism, prosecutors were
uniformly confident that their objectivity in case review
would be unaffected in a case where, for example, a
prosecutorial violation of the requirement of Brady by
one of their current co-workers was alleged. Interestingly,
given that all Brady violations occur despite an ethical
obligation, several prosecutors referenced their ethical
obligation to disclose any Brady information as proof that
such disclosures would be made:
If there was a claim that Brady material
had been withheld, we would certainly
investigate that to know whether or
not that was in fact that case. If it were
in fact the case, we would divulge the
Brady material. We would involve the
judiciary and determine what the next
appropriate step was.

While the CRU may identify instances of prosecutorial
or police misconduct, the ability to administer discipline
for such actions does not rest within the CRU. Rather,
the CRU is limited to communicating the evidence

U.S. v. Olsen, 737 F. 3d 625 (9th Cir. 2013).

In some sense, this is the reverse of the inquiry conducted by many CRUs in looking at ineffective assistance of counsel claims – the question is not whether the
information was available to law enforcement or the prosecutor, but whether the individual was actually aware of and influenced by the information in the adjudication
of the case.
52

53
The NCIIC enabling statute does provide that the underlying case may be removed from its original jurisdiction as a court reviews how best to address the error
identified in the case. North Carolina General Statutes §15A-1469(a1).

of misconduct to the DA, the appropriate executive
committee or the office’s General Counsel for review
and further action. This is true even within the NCIIC,
which is required to disclose information about potential
prosecutorial misconduct to “the appropriate authority”
for such matters.
For offices that only review cases for factual accuracy (as
opposed to cases where actual innocence is predicated
on the due process argument of withholding evidence
known at the time of trial), Brady presents an interesting
conundrum. While the conviction may have been secured
in part because of the office’s own error or misconduct, the
later CRU review may still conclude that the conviction
is factually accurate. A few offices go a step farther,
suggesting that evidence of Brady violations might
increase their willingness to vacate convictions with
prejudice given the Office’s more direct role in depriving
the defendant of rights.

without limiting the ability of appropriate entities (e.g.,
the DA or State Bar for prosecutors, or an internal affairs
or disciplinary board, for police) to ensure accountability
for intentional misconduct. At the same time, DAs and
CRU heads who take the process seriously would be
well advised to have clearly stated policies not just for
the handling of Brady material discovered during a case
review, but for the separate investigative process to assess
the culpability of the prosecutors or investigators in the
underlying case.

While some view the inability to enforce disciplinary
action for official misconduct as evidence that the CRU
is in fact a CRINO, it should be pointed out that the
separation of discipline for reckless or intentional
misconduct from the fact-based event review is actually
a best practice in many industries, including healthcare
and aviation,54 and is expressly recommended in the “Just
Culture Event Review” procedures recommended to the
U.S. Attorney General by the National Commission on
Forensic Science.55 Separating issues of discipline and
blame from the investigation of what actually happened
during the commission of a crime encourages the
participation of knowledgeable participants in the events.
Conversely, prosecutors, police officers and witnesses
with knowledge of the case might be more reticent if
their participation would cause another to be punished.
In this way, ensuring that the CRU is not a disciplinary
body actually furthers the goals of the case review,56

54

See footnote 11 above.

National Commission on Forensic Science, Directive Recommendation: Root Cause Analysis (RCA) In Forensic Science, referred to United States Attorney
General on August 11, 2015. Available at https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/work-products-adopted-commission, and attached as Appendix C.
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See generally id. and articles cited in footnote 11.
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CRU Transparency
The evaluation of a CRU has both a direct and an indirect
component. The direct evaluation looks at the freedom
that a CRU is given by the DA to review cases previously
adjudicated by the DA’s Office where errors are alleged,
and the policies and procedures that it has developed to
conduct and act upon those case reviews.The indirect
evaluation takes a wider lens and considers the inherent
skepticism of the CRU enterprise from the defense bar,
the political currency of the CRU to the current DA and
his/her potential challengers, and the utility of the CRU
to the community as a whole.
Independence and flexibility are important factors in
each of these assessments, providing insight into how

the CRU conducts its activities and how those activities
are perceived by external stakeholders. The third category
on which governmental actors reviewing their own past
actions for error can and will be judged is transparency.
The ability of those outside the DA’s Office to see what
actions a CRU is taking and to understand the rationales
behind those actions is what enables communities to
verify the good faith of their CRUs – or validate their
worst suspicions. The CRU’s decisions on what to
publicize and what to shield from the public eye impact
the willingness of petitioners to use the CRU, and inform
the public’s judgment of whether the CRU is engaging
in good faith reviews of allegations of error, or is simply
an effort to curry public favor that lacks legitimacy and
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integrity. Finally, and assuming that the CRU is sincere,
transparency should allow DAs to make more powerful
arguments to their County Commissioners about the
need to prioritize funds to the CRU over time.

written protocols or protocols may actually constrain
the prosecutor’s ability to use his or her full discretion
to advocate for the best result based on a totality of the
circumstances at the time of the review:

For all of these reasons, while due deference should be
given to the need for confidentiality of case records,
safety for potential witnesses, and the emotional needs of
victims of crime and their families and friends, it is also
important for DAs and CRU leaders to maximize the
reasonable transparency of CRU activity and to publicize
the CRU’s impact within the Office and within the larger
community.

The post-conviction courts and the
appeals courts have to set standards in
an adversarial [setting].  You cross this
line or you’re below this line and it’s
either good or it’s not good. That, to
us, limits tremendously our flexibility,
because what we talk about is not
really the legalities of things, we’re
talking about the use of prosecutorial
discretion. That takes us outside the
realm of what… the judicial process
does, why in an extrajudicial fashion
we can form our own standards, which
again are not bright line standards. It
has to be to the extent where this is
all going to be subjective.

Publishing CRU Policies and Procedures
Jurisdictions with CRUs have wrestled with a two-tier
threshold question regarding transparency: should the
policies and practices of the CRU be in writing, and
should they be publicly available? Several of the most
active and established CRUs (e.g., Brooklyn, Dallas,
Santa Clara) have very few, if any written policies
and procedures, while other offices (e.g., Cuyahoga,
Manhattan, Oneida) have detailed and public protocols
and procedures available for all to review.
Having policies and procedures makes it easy for everyone
to know what to expect from the CRU process, and
provides concrete information for CRU assessment and
accountability. On the other hand, written policies and
procedures create two potential downsides for a CRU.
First, several prosecutors expressed concern that written
policies and procedures might paradoxically limit their
flexibility in handling case reviews. Each case reviewed
presents a unique fact pattern and underlying scenario
that led to the erroneous conviction. It is reasonable to
assume that written policies, no matter how well written,
will not account for every situation that arises, and poorly
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[We are] in the process of making
written goals, directives and policies.
Necessarily, those have to be
somewhat amorphous because the
second you put in bright line stuff then
you create another layer of litigation
which is something that we just don’t
want to get into because it doesn’t help
us.  Sure, it’s great for defense litigants
but we don’t want [petitioners] to be
defense litigants, we want them to be
investigatory partners.

Figure 14. CRUs with Written Protocols
(n=20)

30%

70%

¢  Yes         ¢  No
The concern for maximum flexibility can be taken as
sincere coming from such established CRUs as Brooklyn
and Dallas. At the same time, for experienced prosecutors
and legal writers to claim that written protocols constrain
their activities seems disingenuous to some. Drafting
protocols with non-absolute language and exception
clauses for special circumstances that protect the flexibility
of the CRU is easily done, and would provide myriad
benefits to the CRU. One example of this drafting can be
seen in the written policies of Oneida County (NY) with
regard to the scope of the CRU’s review. The protocol
is clear without limiting the flexibility of the DA or the
Unit:
While the scope of the review of the
CIP57 is ordinarily limited to claims of
actual innocence, the CIP reserves the
right in extraordinary circumstances,
to conduct its review in cases where it
is claimed that the level of offense for
which the defendant stands convicted
is overwhelmingly disproportionate

57

Oneida County calls its unit a Conviction Integrity Program, or CIP.

to the criminal conduct that actually
occurred. The Committee serving
under the District Attorney, shall have
complete discretion as to whether,
and in what instances, any such noninnocence claims of over-conviction
shall be reviewed.

The transparency and accountability inherent in
publishing written policies and procedures for conviction
reviews should help a DA convince petitioners, defense
counsel, judges, and the community that the CRU is
an honest, good faith endeavor. Written policies and
procedures also provide an opportunity for feedback from
external stakeholders and the community, which will both
improve the policies and increase the goodwill generated
by the CRU while bringing some who were skeptical over
to support the CRU.
The benefit of transparency may be most beneficial to
newer CRUs, which are likely to be more vulnerable
in the court of public opinion. One of the CRUs that
participated in this review lacks a direct reporting line to
the DA, lacks dedicated personnel (including the head of
the CRU, whose responsibilities exist on top of an active
and high-profile caseload), and has not yet recommended
any exonerations, including for individuals who have
subsequently been exonerated in habeas proceedings. This
office may be articulating a sincerely held view supporting
conviction review for cases of actual innocence, but
without more, the growing claims that have begun
throughout the jurisdiction and elsewhere that the unit is
actually a CRINO will continue unabated, reducing the
unit’s utility for the DA’s Office in question.
What Protocols Should be Committed to Writing? In
general, offices should commit protocols to writing that
will assist participants in case submission and review,
and what to expect in terms of the activities of the CRU.
While different offices have handled this in different
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ways, examples of areas that could benefit from written
policies and procedures include:
•

Process for claim submission

•

Types of cases CRU will/will not accept for
review

•

Standard of review for initial case acceptance
(screening)

•

Standard of review for case review

•

Standard of review for vacating a conviction

•

Who will/will not conduct a case review

•

Role of petitioner and petitioner’s counsel in
case review

•

Role of original prosecutor and/or investigator
in case review

•

Requirements on waiver of attorney/client
privilege, or use of a collaboration agreement

•

Sharing of documents, including potential
reciprocity, with petitioner/petitioner’s attorney

•

Sharing of information learned/ evidence
discovered during case review

•

Conduct, payment for forensic testing

•

Procedures for allegations of government
misconduct

•

Disclosure of final decision after case review
and supporting rationale

•

Ability of petitioner to revisit process after
final decision

•

Ability of CRU/DA’s Office to use information
obtained during investigation in future
litigation

The NCIIC has developed a more extensive set of policies
and procedures, going beyond case-related issues into
structural and operational concerns:
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The human resources policies, all of
those that you think of you need for
an office, we have all of those. We
have office policies on interviews, and
that includes safety on an interview…
How do we check in? We’re going out
in the field to lots of different places
and we have rules that I need staff to
follow when they’re doing that. What
are the things you can and can’t say
when you’re doing an interview? How
are you going to record it? Who are
you going to bring with you? We have
a policy on evidence collection that
everyone has to follow, all the forms
that they have to fill out, the things that
they have to do.We have policies we’ve
adopted like the hazardous workplace
policies for when we are collecting
evidence and things like that. We have
what are then, what we call sort of
more “go-bys,” less formal, these are
the best practices that we’ve seen
[in certain situations]. Those types of
things, and that’s a lot that, again, has
been just developed over time and
those are things that we’re eager to
share.

The NCIIC’s policies, procedures and protocols – many of
which are not published – make clear that while drafting
protocols can be a tedious and time-consuming task,
carefully written protocols can give clarity, transparency,
and legitimacy to the CRU effort, while protecting
flexibility and prosecutorial discretion at all times.

Transparency to Victims of Crime
One of the most challenging and difficult parts of a
prosecutor’s job is managing each criminal case in a way
that considers the complex emotional needs of victims of
crime and their families. In the CRU context, the victims’

emotions are even more sympathetic. The CRU case
review re-examines a tragedy – often a violent trauma
– that befell the victims and their families. Opening the
case for re-investigation due to a potential error of guilt
or innocence forces victims to relive this trauma while
reducing the victim’s trust in the system. In some cases it
may even add to the anguish of a victim or witnesses, who
may have unwittingly aided in a mistaken identification
or bolstered a shaky (and ultimately inaccurate) case.

Other CRUs find their obligations with regard to victims
controlled by statute. In California, for example, the issue
is governed by the California Victims’ Bill of Rights
Act of 2008, also known as Marsy’s Law. Marsy’s Law
requires prosecutors’ offices to give victims reasonable
notice of any court proceeding involving the case(s) in
which they were victims, and the opportunity for the
victim to reasonably confer with the prosecuting attorney
and to be heard at any proceedings related to the case.

At the same time, victims’ sense of ownership over the
crime – that it is their crime, it happened to them – and
the need to provide justice to them can generate an
emotional need to participate in decisions regarding the
outcome, especially in a situation where it now appears
that the DA’s Office may have mishandled it from the
start.

The NCIIC has a policy of informing victims upon entry
into the “formal inquiry” phase, and permitting the victim
(or his/her next of kin if the victim is deceased) the ability
to share his/her views throughout the formal inquiry
process. In addition, the Commission will notify victims
30 days prior to the official hearing on the case. Victims
are invited to attend with 10 days’ notice, and they are
immediately informed of the result of the hearing in any
event.

In an effort to be mindful of and sensitive to these
emotional complexities, many CRUs wait to inform
victims of their work until there is something substantial
to discuss:
We try to keep [victims] informed…
The problem is that when you
engage them at an early point of our
investigation, they invariably become
advocates to not release the person,
and sometimes engage counsel to
press that. If they have information
that is germane in terms of the guilt or
innocence of the defendant, as opposed
to their belief or what they’ve been told
or what the jury had, we generally will
not contact them until we are at the
end part of our investigation, where
pretty much we know which direction
we’re going.There again, we don’t want
them tampering with the process…
[T]his isn’t about victim impact. This is
about whether the person has done it
or not.

The Middlesex County DA has constructed a middle
ground between the emotional response of the victim
of the underlying crime and the reality that victims and
their emotions matter in addressing errors in the system.
Middlesex CRU protocols state that the prosecutor
leading the investigation should confer with a Victim
Witness Advocate prior to presenting the case to the
Committee to determine if, and when, any victim(s)
should be notified of review. It is then the responsibility
of the Victim Witness Advocate to discuss the case to the
specific victims involved in the underlying crime, and give
the victims their opportunity to present their views and
concerns to the Committee. In this way, the risk that the
victims of the underlying crime will have undue influence
on the CRU process is minimized, and the presentation
of a very difficult emotional issue for the victims is done
compassionately by an expert in such conversations.
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Transparency of Case Review Process,
Decision and Rationale
Even a well-resourced CRU must balance realities
of limited resources and the likelihood of success
with the unquenchable thirst of a petitioner, almost
always incarcerated, to keep pushing for additional
testing, investigation, etc. to prove his/her innocence
and secure his freedom. Add to that the challenges of
finding evidence and witnesses from a case that may be
years or decades old, individuals who may not want to
acknowledge that the case could have been decided in
error, and general skepticism surrounding the fact that
the DA is investigating a closed conviction, and the
challenge of how, and when, to end an investigation
where the conclusion is not to reverse or vacate the
conviction becomes clear. The decision to stop reviewing
a petition for actual innocence presents a somewhat
paradoxical, but important question: in a situation where
a petitioner steadfastly maintains his innocence despite
some evidence to the contrary, how does a good faith
CRU dedicated to ensuring accurate convictions decide
when to stop an investigation?
CRUs differ in their answers to this question, from the
linear “[w]hen facts deviate from allegations, you stop”
to the circular “[w]hen you’re done, you’re done.” Others
compared it to the decision of whether to charge or to go
to trial, saying that the decision to stop an investigation
was based on a multitude of factors that were difficult to
define in total:
It’s hard to tell. If we get something
definitive, certainly in the meantime,
then we can act. If they give us their
theory of the case and we look at
some of the leads and we look at some
of the theories that they’re putting
forward and it’s not going anywhere,
then we may get to the point at some
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point where we’re just going to decide
that there’s nothing new here and
we’re not going to do anything with
regard to the conviction.

The best practice for sincere CRUs here may borrow from
concepts of procedural justice, which seek to improve
judicial listening, respect and empathy for the individuals
on their dockets. Similarly, CRUs that truly engage in
a collaborative process are likely to get better (i.e., less
contentious) outcomes among petitioners or counsel
who (a) feel that the CRU has honestly and openly
discussed the allegations of error, (b) have been involved
in the CRU’s process and know what resources have been
expended and what steps have been taken in the service
of the investigation, and (c) have received substantive
rather than bureaucratic or administrative reasons for not
conducting certain testing, etc.
Once a decision not to proceed is made, some CRUs
have a practice of providing notification to petitioners
in writing, while others communicate more informally,
particularly if petitioner is represented by counsel. As in
other settings, some CRUs are comfortable sharing the
rationale for the cessation of the review: “we’re happy to
communicate our findings to defense counsel and listen
to their reactions, but more often than not, you’ve made
your mind up,” while others choose to be more vague,
feeling that a reason is not required for the rejection
of a claim, and providing one simply leaves an opening
for a persistent petitioner to continue to keep an actual
innocence conversation alive longer than is minimally
necessary.

Collection and Publication of Metrics and
Accomplishments
As stewards of taxpayer funds, it is the responsibility
of the DA and CRU head to understand the impact of
the CRU they manage, and such information should
generally be made available to the public for evaluation
and comment.58 Such disclosures should benefit the
Office, the Unit and the community, as they will dispel
concerns that the CRU is merely a PR stunt and
allow for thoughtful discussion regarding appropriate
modifications and agreement among stakeholders
over time. The word “should” in the previous sentence,
however, looms large. DAs who provide such information
are subject to different interpretations of the information
from political opponents, the media, and others, and thus
it is incumbent upon the defense bar, judges, and the
media to understand and support such voluntary steps
towards fact-based case review, giving more transparent
jurisdictions the benefit of the doubt when evaluating the
results.

annual report of the NCIIC. The data presented in the
NCIIC’s Annual report provides an excellent template
that to date has not been followed by any other CRU,
though the data could easily be gathered and provided by
each CRU without any danger or injury to specific case
investigations, witnesses, victims or next of kin, or other
issues around confidentiality.

Tracking the CRU’s activity and determining metrics
for its utility can and should go beyond the number of
exonerations that the CRU recommends. While some
CRUs have exonerated dozens of individuals and created
impressive goodwill in their jurisdictions, a lack of
exonerations should not necessarily be viewed as evidence
of CRINO. Generating large numbers of exonerations
may be more challenging than it seems. CRUs to date
have grown in large urban centers, by and large, and
smaller, less populated jurisdictions can be expected to
have fewer allegations and instances of error to review.
A more reliable approach to reassure external observers
in the jurisdiction of the true intentions of the CRU,
while making a case to legislators and others about its
utility, would be the dissemination of data about the
CRU’s activities. Examples of what activities might be
useful to measure the CRU’s impact are suggested by the

58

As with other disclosures involving criminal cases, individually identifiable information should be disclosed with care, if at all, to protect victims and witnesses.
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North Carolina Innocence
Inquiry Commission:
A Case Study of
Independence and
Transparency
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The CRU with the most independent and transparent
structure (though not the most flexible one) is not a
“traditional” CRU at all, but rather the state-funded North
Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC),
which effectively serves as a clearinghouse for all postconviction claims of actual innocence throughout the state,
conducting investigations independent of the prosecutors’
offices involved, and making recommendations regarding
the claims to a review board and ultimately to a judicial
tribunal at which the prosecutors and victims may
participate.
The NCIIC has no prosecutors involved in its case reviews,
which simultaneously underscores its independence from
allegations of prosecutorial bias and makes a strong
argument that there is nothing inherently prosecutorial
about the skills needed to thoroughly investigate past
cases where inaccurate convictions are alleged. Rather, the
membership of the NCIIC consists entirely of outside
perspectives, including:
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•

One victims’ advocate;

•

One criminal defense attorney;

•

One member of the public (currently a
Commissioner on Urban Planning and
Community Economic Development);

The staff of the Commission is similarly devoid of
prosecutors, consisting of:
•

Executive Director

•

Associate Director

•

Associate Counsel

•

Paralegal

•

Legal Investigator

•

Grant Staff Attorney (paid for by federal grant
money for DNA case review)

•

Grant Investigator (paid for by federal grant
money for DNA case review)

While some members of the NCIIC have law degrees,
all view their roles as primarily investigational; they
will present their findings to a Judge, and ultimately are
requesting a judicial hearing at which the DA’s Office
may speak and/or present.
Prior to moving for a judicial hearing, however, the
NCIIC consults with its Advisory Board, which is
required by law to consist of the following:
•

Superior Court Judge

•

Sheriff

•

One Sheriff; and

•

Criminal Defense Attorney

•

Two discretionary members appointed by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

•

Prosecuting Attorney

•

Victim’s Advocate

•

Public Member (non-attorney, non-judge)

•

Three (3) Discretionary Appointments by the
Chief Justice.

http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/gar.html, accessed August 31, 2015.

The statewide Innocence Commission model should, in
theory, allow for centralized (and therefore more plentiful
and experienced) case reviews, and those reviews should be
at least as objective as reviews conducted by “traditional”
CRUs, who are investigating activities within their own
offices. But the strategy is not without its potential
downsides. First, where traditional CRUs are voluntary
activities sponsored by DAs, the NCIIC is a legislative
mandate that is being imposed on all prosecutors in
North Carolina. It would be surprising if some of those
prosecutors did not feel that the NCIIC is an undesired
intrusion on their work, a Monday morning quarterback
intent on exposing the office’s mistakes. Without any
ownership of the review, these prosecutors are more likely
to bristle at the NCIIC’s requests, and as elected officials
outside of a reporting chain linked to the NCIIC, they
are more able to oppose a recommendation of dismissal
or vacation of charges than other CRUs.
Another potential weakness of the NCIIC is its inability
to implement any of its recommendations, including
its findings of actual innocence. Rather, the NCIIC
makes a recommendation regarding each specific case
to the Commission as a whole. “If five or more of the
eight voting members of the Commission conclude
there is sufficient evidence of factual innocence to merit
judicial review, the case shall be referred to the senior
resident superior court judge in the district of original
jurisdiction by filing with the clerk of court the opinion
of the Commission with supporting findings of fact, as
well as the record in support of such opinion…” From

here, the court appoints a panel of three judges, none of
whom have been previously involved in the case, and a
hearing is held for the NCIIC, the DA in question and
petitioner’s counsel (who may be court-appointed if the
petition to the CRU was filed pro se). Only if the threejudge panel unanimously feels that the convicted person
is innocent by clear and convincing evidence can the
petitioner released with the dismissal of all or any charge.
There are multiple opportunities among the many steps
between the NCIIC’s initial recommendation and an
actual finding of exoneration for a savvy DA to delay or
disrupt the case review process.
The transparency of the NCIIC, however, provides a
way to judge whether the cynical view in the preceding
paragraph is occurring. The NCIIC posts on its web
site an annual report prescribed by the North Carolina
legislature.59 The report, which includes the Commission’s
case filter, allows the general public to review the size
and scope of the actual innocence problem in North
Carolina. The top of the filter may be seen as a reasonable
proxy for the number of people incarcerated in the state
who believe they should be exonerated; the middle
can be a proxy for the percentage of the believers who
have articulated colorable claims of innocence; and the
bottom, the exonerations, shows the actual impact of the
NCIIC and provides a group of cases ripe for careful root
cause analysis and dissemination of recommendations for
improvements throughout the criminal justice system in
the jurisdiction.
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The Annual Report also provides the following key
information about the Commission:
•

Commission members and staff;

•

A description of activities, including four
cases that led to judicial hearings exonerating
individuals based on actual innocence. In these
cases, which are matters of public record, all
documents used in the Commission’s exoneration
hearing are posted on the NCIIC website;

•

•

•

Annual case statistics:
o

New claims of actual innocence: 180

o

Average number of new claims of actual
Innocence per year: 205

o

Number of claims of actual innocence since
inception of NCIIC: 1,642

o

Number of claims reviewed and closed:
1,482

o

Number of exonerations: 8

Specific case statistics:
o

Types of crime at issue

o

Basis of the innocence claims submitted

o

Reasons for rejection.

Results of investigations (a useful metric for
the NCIIC specifically, which has been granted
subpoena power and thus wants to show its
ability to conduct thorough investigations)
o

•

Number of cases where the NCIIC found
physical evidence or files reported missing by
other agencies: 18

Presentations made to other agencies

This information suggests an active case filter statewide;
with a little more research, it could easily be broken
down by case and by jurisdiction to evaluate how various
counties within the state are participating in terms of
number of cases, average duration of reviews, etc. The
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average time for a case from petition to resolution across
the various parts of the funnel, for example, could inform
policy makers can identify appropriate levels of staffing
to handle a reasonable flow of additional claims in the
future, which may be useful as cases do not always appear
in regular time intervals.
The NCIIC is an admirable experiment, creating a topdown model for cultural change and a thoughtful safety
net for the criminal justice system to identify and review
potential errors in the administration of justice. It remains
to be seen whether the model operates more effectively
and efficiently than the “traditional” CRU model, and
its inability to implement “best practices” that might be
identified in the course of conducting case reviews may
limit its ability to help prevent the recurrence of errors in
the future. Still, the NCIIC’s emphasis on independence
and transparency and its willingness to investigate cases
openly and objectively bode well for its future, and
provide a useful counterpoint for CRUs operating within
DA’s Offices.

Measuring the Impact
of CRUs
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As CRUs proliferate across the country, it is important
to realize that the lack of a CRU is not proof of an
unwillingness to review plausible claims of actual
innocence, just as the existence of a CRU is not in itself
proof of the willingness to conduct them.
The sort of data collection contemplated here does not
seek to publicize case-specific information that is not
already part of the public record, or to reveal information
that could jeopardize witnesses, victims, or next of
kin. Rather, the assessment of aggregated information
about the activities undertaken by the CRU can
convey quantitative and qualitative information about
inaccuracies in the criminal justice system and thoughts
about how to reduce them over time. This could easily be
reflected in a case funnel that show the process from the
CRU’s receipt of a request for assistance through to the
decision to vacate a conviction. Such a funnel might have
the stages set forth in Table 2 on page 73.
A unified case funnel of all CRUs that submitted data
in response to our requests is below. Fields in gray were
not reported by the CRUs. We supplemented the data
provided with information posted on the National
Registry of Exonerations.60 Of the nineteen (19) CRUs
that participated in our survey and interviews, only eleven
(11) published or provided their case funnel information.61
The information was not provided for a variety of reasons,
with the most popular being that the statistics were not

Conviction
Review
Units:
A National
Perspective
72

kept, the individual was too busy, or the office decided not
to release the data publicly.
It is important to recognize that case funnels are not
static. As previously noted, CRU policies will impact the
number of requests for assistance received by the CRU,
and these policies may change over time. In addition, the
number of petitions received by an office is likely to be at
its largest within the first 6-24 months after announcing
the CRU, and then can be expected to increase shortly
after any published exoneration, as other inmates hear of
a successful petition to the CRU. It is probably safe to
assume, however, that these numbers will diminish over
time.
The information we have suggested here should not be
burdensome to collect or to publish. Most of it, if not
all, is likely to be retrievable from even a basic case
management system, or can be kept “on the fly” by the
person handling the intake of petitions for assistance to
the CRU. Understanding the flow of cases through the
CRU funnel and gathering deidentified information
about the underlying issues in these cases will go a long
way towards establishing the value of the CRU within
a jurisdiction and will support requests for additional
funding, as well as chart a course towards creating a
culture of sustained self-evaluation and self-improvement
that is crucial to the reduction of inaccurate convictions
over time.

60
The National Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx, last accessed October 8, 2015. Individual exonerees whose
profiles included the “CIU” tag were counted and distributed by county.
61

http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/stats.html, last accessed October 8, 2015.

Table 2. Case Funnels for Conviction Review Units.
		Requests						
Year
for
Substantial Reviews 				
NRE
Office
Established Review Investigations Pending Exonerations Rejections Investigations Exonerations**
Bexar County, TX

2015

200

50

15

1

175

15

1

Pima County, AZ

2014

35

17

15

0

0

17

-

Middlesex County, MA

2014

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Cuyahoga County, OH

2014

70

15

-

0

-

-

-

Philadelphia County, PA

2014

101

6

89

0

-

-

-

Nassau County, NY

2013

3

2

0

0

0

2

-

Ventura County, CA

2012

17

15

2

1

11

5

1

Cook County, IL

2012

435

435

-

12

238

222

14

Lake County, IL

2012

16

5

1

2

1

2

2

Oneida County, NY

2012

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Kings County, NY

2011

-

-

-

-

-

-

21

San Diego, CA

2011

-

-

-

-

-

-

1

Baltimore, MD

2011

-

-

-

-

-

-

3

New York, NY

2010

175

17

0

5

-

1

4

Colorado Justice
Review Program

2010-13

4,976

-

-

1

-

-

-

Wayne County, MI

2010-13

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Harris County, TX

2009

-

-

-

-

-

-

77

Dallas County, TX

2007

-

-

35

28

-

-

25

North Carolina
Inn. Inq. Comm.

2006

1,768

1,549

-

8*

-

9

-

2004-08,
2010

1,447

6

0

5

1

0

4

9,243

2,117

157

55

426

273

153

Santa Clara
County, CA

TOTALS		
*
**

NCIIC reports 8 exonerations at hearing and one additional exoneration due to its investigations.
Includes data reported by National Registry of Exonerations
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Can CRUs Prevent
Future Errors?
As currently practiced, the CRU model is a model of
error remediation, as opposed to one of error prevention.
CRUs work to identify cases where errors may have been
committed, and they take steps to correct those errors.
Done conscientiously, it is a valuable and important
service, adding tremendous legitimacy to our criminal
justice system. To the extent that the process deployed
by the CRU is a collaborative process with reduced
adversarial posturing driven solely to find the truth, CRUs
have the ability to transcend both the administrative
limitations of post-conviction appellate litigation and our
cynicism about the adversarial process, and truly improve
the functioning of the criminal justice system.

At the same time, a CRU that merely contents itself with
resolving or redressing errors in the adjudication of guilt
or innocence is missing a far larger and more important
opportunity to improve the system. As the focal point
for analysis of cases where errors are alleged, CRUs are
well positioned to be the leading advocate of training
and implementation of “best practices” that will assist
not just prosecutors or investigators in DA’s Offices, but
law enforcement, defense attorneys, judges, and juries to
prevent such errors in the future.
Recent conferences or symposia discussing CRUs62
suggest that DAs are starting to understand this potential,

62
Northern California Innocence Project Symposium on Conviction Integrity Units, Oct. 28, 2015; Kings County (NY) District Attorney’s Office Summit on
Wrongful Convictions, Nov. 5, 2015.
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but that their CRUs have not translated this potential
into reality. The gap between observing this opportunity
and implementing effective reform can be vast, and most
individuals running CRUs tell a story very different than
their District Attorneys regarding their ability to conduct
effective analyses of why a mistake was made in the
adjudication of a case, much less have the time or the
resources to actually advocate for, design, or implement
preventative reforms to such errors. While some CRUs
have conducted training on, for example, optimized
procedures for conducting photographic lineups to
minimize eyewitness identification mistakes or rewritten
policies for the handling of Brady material in criminal
cases, such actions are more likely a response to news
articles or conversations with other prosecutors than
they are an actual feedback loop generated by a specific
case review within the office. What’s more, such activity
regularly occurs in offices without CRUs as well, making
it difficult to suggest that CRUs have somehow “raised
the bar” on best practices and training.
Part of the challenge is administrative. Almost no CRUs
gather data about the cases reviewed,and what data has been
gathered is predominantly administrative, rather than the
disciplined “Just Culture Event Review” recommended in
other industries and in, for example, a crime lab setting.63
It is important to realize that reviews to improve the
safety of a system, or to prevent future errors within that
system, are inherently different than the investigation
of factual innocence that the CRU undertakes. Just
Culture Event Reviews are non-disciplinary reviews
of unintended outcomes – which might include errors,
mistakes, adverse events, or misconduct – to understand
the environmental, procedural, supervisory, or other
circumstances that enabled, incented, or failed to prevent
the unintended outcome. The case review conducted by
a CRU, by contrast, is a fact-based evaluation of guilt or
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innocence in a criminal case. Thus, in cases where the
CRU decides that the criminal justice system has made
an error, it should ensure that the jurisdiction is actively
engaging in a Just Culture Event Review to learn from
the error, and prevent its recurrence.
None of the offices we spoke to have implemented
such review, nor have they looked at their case filters
as potential databases for aggregated analysis, useful to
catalog the types of errors in the cases they review for
potential use in trend-spotting or contextual learning.64
In fairness to CRUs, there is an undeniable structural
limitation on the ability of a CRU to implement
procedural improvements to reduce errors. As a creation
within the DA’s Office, the authority of the CRU to
mandate changes to law enforcement activity to prevent
future errors extends only as far as the DA’s Office.
Certainly, many of the errors that can lead to inaccurate
convictions are committed by prosecutors, but many are
committed in other parts of the criminal justice system
as well. Inaccurate eyewitness identifications and false
confessions, for example, are typically committed during
the investigation phase when a police department is in
charge of the case. Ineffective assistance of counsel is
based on the activity of defense counsel. A CRU might
rightfully identify a need for modified practices to
address these problems, but it lacks the ability to force
the implementation of the solutions.

63
National Commission on Forensic Science, Directive Recommendation: Root Cause Analysis (RCA) In Forensic Science, referred to United States Attorney
General on August 11, 2015. Available at https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/work-products-adopted-commission, and attached as Appendix C.
64
One challenge that individual prosecutors’ offices face here is that the number of cases reviewed in a single jurisdiction, particularly in smaller offices, is unlikely
to be sufficiently large to draw accurate systemic conclusions from the cases. A state-wide or nationwide data gathering model may be needed for such aggregated
analysis.

Figure 15. Feedback Loop.
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Still, CRUs persist in the attempt to learn from the cases
they review and to implement improvements to the
adjudication process that are designed to reduce errors
in the future. “We do spend time talking about not just
specific cases, but are there policies, are there procedures,
are there things we can put into place to prevent some of
these cases from happening in the first place.” All agree
in theory that some sense of learning from these errors
is useful, but too few offices are conducting such work in
practice:
Is it the role of the CRU to identify,
communicate, or implement changes
as a result of lessons learned in
the cases that you’re reviewing?  
I’m hoping that it will be. It hasn’t
historically been that. The unit was
created with the notion of making sure
that the claims of people, innocence
claims are properly addressed, and
they’re addressed without some of the

Another question unresolved by CRUs to date is how
to address situations in which there could be multiple
instances of the same error. No CRUs were eager to
embrace the conduct of an “audit” that would expand
a case review to review a large group of related cases
to ensure that all potential incidences of the error
were identified and addressed. In such situations, most
people interviewed suggested that they would conduct
broader reviews “when they feel it necessary” but were
not able to describe what those conditions might be.
For whatever reason, such audits appear to be more
easily embraced when pertaining to a crime lab, and less
clear when pertaining to a colleague in a DA’s Office or
a police officer. Brooklyn and Harris County, however,
have conducted or are in the process of conducting such
reviews, and their work may serve as tutorials for such
reviews moving forward.
Several CRUs indicated a history of, or a philosophy
supportive of conducting audits in instances where
prosecutorial or police misconduct have been alleged.
The publicity surrounding Detective Louis Scarcella
in Brooklyn is one example of this; the CRU is in the
process of reviewing 150 cases involving the Detective
to determine whether any of those cases should be
reinvestigated. In another jurisdiction, the DA conducted
an audit based on an intentional act of bad faith taken by
a prosecutor. The theory in that office was that a discovery
of intentional misconduct was something likely to have
been repeated, and so delving into additional cases for
that prosecutor was necessary to rule out other potential
affected cases.
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In truth, the creation of a broad-based “cycle of
improvement” that will analyze errors found by CRUs and
implement reforms to prevent future errors throughout
the criminal justice system is not something that a CRU
can reasonably be expected to do alone. It requires the
participation of all criminal justice stakeholders within a
jurisdiction. As such, this may be an area where an outside
organization, along the lines of an Innocence Commission,
could add value to CRUs across a broader jurisdiction
(for example, a state). The Texas Innocence Commission,
or the Pennsylvania or California commissions that
reviewed wrongful convictions, could be used to receive
data from prosecutors’ offices on a variety of activities,
including data on cases that are reversed. This data could
be analyzed and discussed with a cross-disciplinary group
and discussions had on how tom implement best practices
throughout the state. The Commission could also have
authority to order a broader review of cases in situations
where the possibility of multiple instances of the same or
similar errors existed.
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Conclusion
The variety of philosophies, policies, and practices across
the 19 CRUs that participated in this project is no surprise.
High-quality Conviction Review Units are balancing
acts, seeking to satisfy a diverse set of stakeholders across
multiple dimensions. CRUs seek to identify and rectify
cases of injustice that have fallen through the cracks of
our judicial system notwithstanding all of its intricate
checks and balances. Given the complexities inherent in
all of these goals, it is probably more surprising to note
how many areas the DAs and leaders of CRUs did agree
on than to observe the differences.

The best CRUs manage to evaluate and resolve a large
number of claims of actual innocence by leveraging
independence, flexibility, and transparency so that all
involved – CRU attorneys, the defense bar, victims of
crime, victims of procedural injustice, and communities –
have confidence that the District Attorney and her office
are focused on the legitimacy of all convictions secured by
the office, and are using a thoughtful and reliable process
of review, evaluation, and communication to ensure that
the CRU’s balancing act is emphasizing the right metrics
for the community (see Figure 16 below).
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Figure 16.The Competing Concerns of Conviction Review Units.
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One could point to the small (but growing) number of
CRU exonerations secured to date as evidence that the
approach has its limitations. On the other hand, with so
many brand-new CRUs, and so little data gathered by
more established CRUs, a complete evaluation of the
utility of the different approaches employed by the CRUs
is clearly premature.
Whether CRUs will live up to their promise is far from
clear. CRUs have the potential to showcase the criminal
justice system working at its best. Done well, a CRU can
be a force of good in the criminal justice community, a
model that operates with objectivity and focuses on realworld truth to integrate adversarial viewpoints, analyze
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conflicting and complex information and address claims
for individuals suffering from a State-imposed injustice.
Whether the model extends and realizes its potential as
a force for education and improvement of techniques to
investigate and adjudicate criminal charges or not, good
faith CRUs that operate with independence, flexibility,
and transparency can build bridges across what is too
often a bitter ideological divide between prosecutors and
defense counsel, and between law enforcement and the
communities they serve, and restore the community’s
faith that each part of the system is operating to ensure
that perpetrators of crime – and only perpetrators of
crime – are held accountable for their acts in ways that
preserve the constitutional freedoms of all.

APPENDIX A.

METHODOLOGY
This paper consists of quotes and synthesized observations
gathered from semi-structured interviews with the
leaders of 19 CRUs throughout the country, as well as
with prosecutors in offices who did not have formal
Conviction Review Units, but who believed that their
offices conducted the analogous work if and when cases
of actual innocence were alleged in their jurisdictions. (A
copy of our questionnaire is included in the appendix to
this paper.) We also spoke to a group of defense attorneys
in the same jurisdictions as the CRUs to understand
how people might perceive the activities of CRUs with
different stated philosophies, policies, or practices.

Conviction Review Units throughout the United States
were identified through internet and other media research.
The Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration
of Justice, with the assistance of Barry Scheck of the
Innocence Project, created an interview questionnaire
(attached below as Appendix B) to be administered to
at least one individual in each office in a leadership or
supervisory role with the CRU in question.
Twenty-four offices were contacted by phone or email
with interview requests, including twenty-three offices
with active CRUs and one office that does not have a
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CRU but was known through personal communication
with the authors to have actively considered starting a
CRU. Of the twenty-three offices with a CRU that were
contacted, seventeen agreed to participate, with other
opting not to participate or not responding to repeated
requests. Of offices that affirmatively elected not to
participate, the reason given for not participating was
a belief on the part of the CRU representative that the
CRU had not been in existence long enough to provide
useful information to the project.
Participation in interviews was voluntary. Interviews
were conducted in person where possible and by phone
where necessary. All interviews were recorded using the
Voice Base recording and human transcription system
unless recording was declined by the interviewee. If
the interviewee declined to be recorded, notes of the
interview were taken contemporaneously. Transcripts or
notes of interviews were logged, coded and organized
in NVivo 10 for Windows. No review of comments
or quotes was permitted unless quotes were sought for
attribution, in which case the quotes have been reviewed
and approved by the individual given attribution. Where
statements were made by an interviewee about the
perspective of external participants, an individual outside
the CRU who was familiar with the CRU’s operations
(e.g., a defense attorney who had communicated with
the CRU in question) was contacted and his/her opinion
requested. Such communications were memorialized
through contemporaneous notes, but were not recorded.
A working draft of this paper was circulated to all
originally contacted CRUs in December, 2015, and
selected data and responses gathered from respondents
were included in this version.
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APPENDIX B.

Interview Guide for Conviction
Review Unit Interviews
A. Office/Unit Demographics
1.

Office
i.

Size of office

ii.

Number of prosecutors
1.

Is there an appeals unit?

2.

Is there a post-conviction unit?

3.

Does state attorney general handle state habeas? If yes, what is relationship with state AG?
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iii. Is there a police or investigator department that is part of the office?
1.

If so, how many investigators?

iv.

Nature of caseload (homicides, robberies, burglaries, narcotics, etc.)

v.

Demographics of jurisdiction

2.

How many different police departments are there within your jurisdiction?

3.

CRU characteristics
i.

When was the CRU first formed?

ii.

Why – what was the occurrence or factor that prompted its creation?

iii. Size of CRU
1.

Number/type of prosecutors?
a.

2.

Do they have other duties in the office? If so, please describe.

Other members who are non-prosecutors, such as investigators or clerical support?
a.

Who do those investigators work for?
i.

Police or prosecutor, and are they

ii.

ex-police detailed or are they independent?

iv.

How is CRU funded?

v.

Is there training for CRU staff ?
1.

What does the training consist of ?

2.

Who does it?

B. Protocols and Procedures
1.

Does the CRU have written protocols and procedures?

2.

If so, what do they cover?

3.

Can we have a copy?

C. Case Acceptance Criteria
1.

What are the sources of your cases/from where will you accept cases?
i.

Public Defender

ii.

Police

iii. Court
iv.

Family member

v.

Innocence Project/non-profit

vi. Other
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2.

What standard do you use before deciding to investigate or review a claim?
i.

Is factual innocence required? What does factual innocence mean?

ii.

A “colorable” claim of factual innocence?

iii. A “plausible” claim of factual innocence?
iv.

A “reasonable possibility” of factual innocence?

v.

If none of these adequately describes the standard, how would you define it?

3.

Do you restrict your review to matters involving only “newly discovered evidence,” i.e., evidence that could
not have been discovered with exercise of due diligence by counsel?

4.

Do you consider “due process” claims while conducting a CRU review such as
i.

Undisclosed Brady/Impeachment material

ii.

Ineffective assistance of counsel

iii. Other “fair trial” claims
iv.

If you do not, is there another unit in the DA’s Office that would consider such a case?

5.

Would you accept a case where the motion for a new trial is outside the statute of limitations?

6.

Do you cumulate or combine in any way evidence pointing toward factual innocence and evidence
supporting a due process claim
i.

In your decision to investigate or review a claim?

ii.

In your decision to grant relief ?

iii. If so, please describe in your own words that process works?
7.

If the CRU discovers at any point in its review of a case that there is a “substantial claim” of misconduct
against a prosecutor, how would that be handled?
i.

By the CRU?

ii.

Referred elsewhere in the office?

iii. Referred to an independent entity or party?
iv.

Is “substantial claim” the standard you would use, or is it another standard?

v.

How severe would the misconduct need to be?
1.

Legal error but honest mistake

2.

Ethical

3.

Criminal

vi. Is there a statutory procedure for such a referral in your jurisdiction? If so, how does it work?
vii. Are you free to follow a different procedure – appoint your own independent entity or party? Do you
think it’s a good or bad practice?
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8.

Same question as 6, except for police misconduct? What triggers an independent person to come in and run
the process or make decisions?

9.

What is your ability to discipline or fire an underperforming prosecutor/investigator, or one who commits
intentional misconduct?

10. Does the CRU consider guilty plea cases?
i.

If so, is there a higher standard that must be met before deciding to review or investigate? What is that
standard?

11. Are there cases where the CRU is more likely to conduct an investigation or review than others?
i.

An application for DNA testing?

ii.

An application for a review of fingerprints?

iii. An application for other scientific testing?
iv.

An application involving allegations of prior unreliable forensic science?

v.

An application involving allegations against a police officer or prosecutor with a prior history of
misconduct?

vi. An application involving allegations against a jailhouse informant?
vii. An application involving allegations of eyewitness identification?
viii. An application involving allegations of a false confession?
ix. Other?
D. Conduct of Review
1.

How many applications received?

2.

How many accepted for investigation or review?

3.

In how many cases did you consent to relief ?

4.

In how many cases did courts grant relief where no agreement could be reached?

5.

What is the breakdown on grounds for relief:
i.

ii.

Innocence;
1.

Based on DNA

2.

Based on other scientific evidence

3.

Recantation

Due process violation
1.

Brady

2.

Ineffective assistance

3.

Other grounds

iii. Both Innocence and due process violations
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6.

What is your practice on post-conviction disclosure of your file and/or police files?

7.

What documents do you make available to petitioner’s counsel in a review?
i.

Open file

ii.

Open file but for safety concerns

iii. Non-privileged

8.

iv.

Originally discoverable

v.

Other standard

Do you reach out to other agencies that might have documents about the case that are not in your physical
possession?
i.

9.

Would you make these documents available to the defense?

What is your practice on requests for disclosure from the petitioner seeking relief ?
i.

Request petitioner’s file except for attorney-client communications?

ii.

Request only documents relating to petitioner’s proffer?

10. Would you consent to greater disclosure of your file or police files if there were an agreement with
petitioner’s counsel not to disclose the information until the Conviction Integrity review process is complete?
11. Will you share documents with opposing counsel and allow them to use those documents in a subsequent
appeal if you find no need to grant relief ?
i.

Would that make you more or less likely to share information?

12. What is the role of the prosecutors who tried the underlying case in the review process
i.

Witness?

ii.

Any role in the decision making process

13. Does petitioner’s counsel get an opportunity to:
i.

Make a presentation?

ii.

Participate in the investigation?

iii. Respond to evidence discovered in the course of the investigation?
iv.

Any other role?

14. Under what circumstances would you do a PCRA test of forensic data/DNA?
i.

Under what circumstances would you:
1.

Conduct that review voluntarily

2.

Agree if asked

3.

Fight the request?
ii.

What if inmate turned down a testing request at trial?

iii. What lab would conduct that testing?
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15. Do you reach out to other agencies that might have documents about the case that are not in your physical
possession?
i.

E.g., medical examiner in Philadelphia

ii.

Would you make these documents available to the defense?

16. What discovery, if anything, do you require the defendant or the source of the allegations for review to turn
over to the CRU?
i.

PAIP suggestion: New, credible, and ideally corroborative evidence

ii.

Example: we will turn over all information except ___________; important to fill in all the blanks there.

iii. Do you have agreements for data sharing to control or limit disclosure to the review, and/or to ensure
no media leaking, etc.?
iv.

Would an information sharing agreement be useful?

v.

If so, what would it need to include?

17. What information would cause you to feel that you had investigated enough?
18. Is the person who brought the case to your attention given a chance to refute your conclusions before they
are announced?
i.

Example: Brooklyn has independent 3 atty interim review panel – they are supposed to come in and
critique the CRU’s review.

ii.

Example: Lake County (IL) has a special paralegal/investigator position, and a 10-person review team
made up of people outside Lake County

19. How are your conclusions announced? Do you explain why you have made a decision and if so, to whom?
E. Criteria for Granting Relief
1.

What is the standard for consenting to relief on innocence grounds?
i.

Clear or convincing evidence of innocence?

ii.

A reasonable probability of a different outcome?

iii. Application involving claim of self-defense or claim of mens rea?
iv.
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Interests of justice?

2.

How is that standard different from what PCRA requires in your jurisdiction?

3.

In consenting to relief on a due process claim, do you consider new factual evidence of innocence unrelated
to the due process claim and not part of the original trial record?

4.

What other factors might you consider in terms of accepting or rejecting factors?

F.

Audits
1.

When a case is reversed for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, have you ever conducted an audit of
prior cases of the prosecutor involved?

2.

The police officers?

3.

The prosecutor’s supervisors?

4.

Do you think such an audit is a good idea? If not, why not?

5.

Learning from error – what they have learned, what is important, what they would advise people to do or
worry about or whatever… political/real limitations in various places.

G. Learning from Error
1.

Does the CRU catalog errors that might have occurred in cases it reviews?

2.

Does it communicate those errors to anyone inside or outside the Office?

3.

It is a role of the CRU to identify, communicate or implement changes as a result of lessons learned in cases
reviewed?
i.

If so, how does the CRU do this?

1.

For internal changes

2.

For external changes (e.g., new eyewitness ID procedures that would need to be implemented by police)
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APPENDIX C.

National Commission on
Forensic Science Directive
Recommendation on Root
Cause Analysis (RCA)
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Subcommittee
Interim Solutions

Commission Action
On August 11, 2015, the Commission voted to adopt this
recommendation with a more than two-thirds majority
(93% affirmative) vote.

Type of Work Product
Policy Recommendation.

Recommendation
The U.S. Attorney General should direct the adoption
of appropriate root cause analysis protocols for all
forensic science service providers (FSSPs) or forensic
science medical providers (FSMPs) who are part of the
federal government or are receiving federal funds, and to
establish policy for restoration procedures that comply
with the recommended root cause analysis process.
RECOMMENDATION: The US Attorney General
should direct the adoption of appropriate root cause
analysis protocols for all forensic science service providers
(FSSPs) or forensic science medical providers (FSMPs)
that are part of the federal government or are receiving
federal funds, and to establish policy for restoration
procedures that comply with the recommended root
cause analysis process.

Background
Forensic laboratories accredited under programs that
adhere to the ISO/IEC 17025, General requirements
for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories,
are required to “establish a policy and a procedure and
shall designate appropriate authorities for implementing
corrective action when nonconforming work or departures
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from the policies and procedures in the management
system or technical operations have been identified.” A
problem or nonconformity may be identified through
a number of different techniques, including internal
and external audits, reviews of the management system,
customer feedback, or staff observations.
Corrective Actions are potential solutions that address
a nonconformity and eliminate or minimize the risk
of repeating the nonconforming work or departure
from policies and procedures. A Corrective Action is a
requirement when any error or nonconformity is identified.
ISO 17025 (4.9.1) states that “The laboratory shall
have a policy and procedures that shall be implemented
when any aspect of its testing and/or calibration work,
or the results of this work, do not conform to its own
procedures or the agreed requirements of the customer.”
(Emphasis added.) ISO 17025 (4.9.2) states that “Where
the evaluation indicates that the nonconforming work
could recur or that there is doubt about the compliance
of the laboratory’s operations with its own policies and
procedures, the corrective action procedures given in 4.11
shall be promptly followed”. In addition, “The laboratory
shall establish a policy and a procedure and shall designate
appropriate authorities for implementing corrective
action when nonconforming work or departures from
the policies and procedures in the management system
or technical operations have been identified.” ISO 17025
(4.11.1). To establish the best corrective actions, and
as required by ISO 17025 (4.11.2), an investigation is
initiated to determine the root cause(s) of the situation or
condition: “The procedure for corrective action shall start
with an investigation to determine the root cause(s) of the
problem.” Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a critical step of
determining corrective actions for substantive errors, and
may be the most important part of establishing proper
corrective actions.

Implementation Recommendations
Understanding that all human systems are fallible, and
that risks in a system can be minimized, the Department
of Justice should encourage federal Forensic Science
Service Providers (FSSPs) and Forensic Science Medical
Providers (FSMPs) to consistently strive to be “high
reliability organizations” and ensure a culture of constant
self-monitoring and self-improvement by incorporating
established practices of “just culture”1 and learning from
error. To this end, the Department of Justice shall require
its FSSPs and FSMPs to create and maintain protocols
around the conduct of Root Cause Analysis (RCA) to
address nonconforming work or departures from policies
or procedures.2 The Department or its designee will
periodically review those RCA policies to ensure they
include the following:
•

Objective guidance as to when a RCA should
be conducted;

•

The regular provision of appropriate training
to key personnel on how a RCA should be
conducted;

•

Training to all employees within the FSSP
and FSMP on RCA principles and processes,
to enhance the quality of the RCA and its
acceptance within the laboratory environment;

•

Proper construction of the investigative team
conducting a RCA;

•

Definition of and procedures for an
investigation that identifies the extent of
nonconforming work and its causal factor(s)
in a blame-free environment, prioritizing
continuous improvement of laboratory
quality, safety and reliability by learning from
nonconformities;

•

Recommendations that identify corrective
actions to minimize the chance of future
recurrence of nonconformities identified in the
RCA;

•

Guidelines that define when and how to
identify other cases that may have also
been affected by an identical or similar
nonconformity, and the obligation to conduct
a retrospective re-analysis of and address such
cases;

•

Communication of the existence of the
nonconformity to internal and external
individuals impacted by the nonconformity;

•

Provision of Safe Harbor to employees
who report nonconformities or near misses,
including use immunity for participation in
an RCA and limitations on the disclosure of
materials generated in the course of an RCA;

•

Implementation of actions designed to
minimize the chance of future similar
nonconformities and to appropriately redress
injury caused by the nonconformity; and

•

Documentation of each nonconformity as well
as the proposed corrective action in a manner
that does not publicly identify confidential
information regarding specific individuals or
cases, but that makes the learnings from the
RCA publicly available for the review and
benefit of other FSSPs and FSMPs.

Implementation Strategy
The US Attorney General should collaborate with FSSPs
and FSMPs as well as experts in the field of RCA to
establish guidelines in compliance with the above for the
design, implementation, and review of RCAs, and for the
periodic review of protocols and procedures regarding
RCAs that may be updated over time. In addition, the
Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC)
should be tasked with further exploration and periodic
definition of best practices in RCA as applied to FSSPs
and FSMPs.

A “just culture” can be defined as “a culture that recognizes that competent professionals make mistakes and acknowledges that even competent professionals will
develop unhealthy norms (shortcuts, “routine rule violations”), but has zero tolerance for reckless behavior.” Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality Glossary,
available at http://psnet.ahrq.gov/popup_glossary.aspx?name=justculture.

1

Different terms may be used for unplanned and/or unintended occurrences in human systems, including adverse events, errors/omissions, mistakes, nonconformities,
etc. We have selected the terms “nonconforming work” or “nonconformity” to include each of these various unplanned and/or unintended occurrences as well as
departures from policies or procedures, and note that any of the above may include good faith or malfeasant behavior. Furthermore, “nonconformity” is broadly defined
herein to include “near misses,” or unplanned occurrences or events that had the potential to result in a nonconformity but did not do so due to a fortunate turn of
events, as opposed to a deliberate system design. Near misses should be addressed with the same diligence and vigor as actual nonconformities.

2
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APPENDIX A:
Supporting Information and Examples of
Root Cause Analysis
Despite the best intentions and best efforts of forensic
science professionals, supervisors, and managers,
nonconformities will occur in forensic laboratories,
as in any complex organization. It is the position of
the National Commission on Forensic Science that all
responsible forensic science providers should embrace
and implement a just culture1 of “learning from error” and
continuous improvement to minimize the occurrence of
nonconformities and/or misconduct in the performance
of forensic science services over time. This is true
regardless of an organization’s history of error, since
“[a]dverse events, like the number of adverse events,
are poor indicators of the general safety of a system…
Safe organizations can still have bad adverse events,
whereas unsafe systems can escape them for long periods.
Furthermore, progress creates new risk that is difficult
to anticipate but is a feature of new procedures and
technologies.”2
Forensic laboratories accredited under programs that
adhere to the ISO/IEC 17025 General requirements for
the competence of testing and calibration laboratories
are required to “establish a policy and a procedure and
shall designate appropriate authorities for implementing
corrective action when nonconforming work or departures
from the policies and procedures in the management
system or technical operations have been identified.” A
problem may be identified through a number of different
techniques, including internal and external audits, reviews
of the management system, customer feedback, or staff
observations.
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3

“Corrective actions” are potential solutions that eliminate
or minimize the risk of repeating the nonconforming work
or departure from policies and procedures. Corrective
action is a requirement when any error or nonconformity
is identified. To identify the best corrective actions, and
as required by ISO 17025,3 an investigation is initiated to
determine the root cause(s) of the situation or condition.
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a critical step and may be
the most important part of identifying and implementing
appropriate corrective actions.
ISO/IEC 17025 also requires laboratories to establish
procedures to identify needed improvements and potential
sources of nonconformities. This proactive process is
termed “preventative action” and follows a similar process
of Root Cause Analysis to identify the best solutions to
prevent or minimize the chance of nonconformity from
occurring.
RCA has been used productively not only throughout the
healthcare industry but also in aviation, manufacturing and
other quality-minded industries to conduct event reviews
that lead to actionable change of policies and procedures
to reduce the occurrence of nonconformities.4 The goal of
RCA is to learn from nonconformities and to implement
corrective actions in order to reduce further similar events
that might compromise lab report or opinion integrity.
An important feature of the RCA is that it is a blamefree analysis: “[b]laming and punishing for adverse events
that are made by well-intentioned people… drives the
problem of iatrogenic harm underground and alienates
people who are best placed to prevent such problems
from recurring.”5

A “just culture” can be defined as “a culture that recognizes that competent professionals make mistakes and acknowledges that even competent professionals will
develop unhealthy norms (shortcuts, “routine rule violations”), but has zero tolerance for reckless behavior.” Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality Glossary,
available at http://psnet.ahrq.gov/popup_glossary.aspx?name=justculture.
Barach P, Berwick DM. Patient Safety and the reliability of health care systems. Ann Intern Med 2003, 138(12):997-8. Barach uses the health care term “adverse
event” to define an unintended outcome; in the forensic science context we use the ISO 9000-defined term “nonconformity,” which encompasses any deviation from a
policy or procedure regardless of its impact.

2

ISO/IEC 17025:2005(E) (hereafter, ISO 17025), General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories, Section 4.11.2 Cause Analysis.
“The procedure for corrective action shall start with an investigation to determine the root cause(s) of the problem.”

A subset of nonconformity is the “near miss,” a
nonconformity or unplanned event that had the potential
to affect the accuracy or reliability of the laboratory results
or work product, but did not do so through a fortuitous
intervention. Only a fortunate break in the chain of
events prevented a potentially systemic nonconformity.
Near misses are nonconformities and must be evaluated
as such. Further, they should be evaluated in the same way
they would be if the nonconformity had actually occurred.
To do otherwise would suggest that because this near
miss did not result in a nonconformity, the contributing
factors that caused the near miss have been resolved.
This document sets forth recommendations for the
standardized use of RCA to identify why an error has
occurred in a forensic laboratory setting and make
recommendations for the prevention of the future
occurrence of similar nonconformities.
Types of Nonconformities Suitable for Root Cause
Analysis and A Structure for Analyzing Causes.
It is common for a RCA to identify multiple factors that
combined to cause the nonconformity. Indeed, the purpose
of the RCA is to identify any and all contributing factors.
While no framework can specifically identify and catalog
all factors that could contribute to a nonconformity, one
framework for evaluating nonconformities has been
provided by British researcher Dr. James Reasons. Dr.
Reasons describes three different types of error:
1.

Decision error: One made because information,
knowledge, or experience is lacking

2.

Skill-based error: One made while engaged in a
familiar task

3.

Perceptual error: One made because input
to one of the five senses is degraded or
incomplete.

These errors typically fall into one of four categories:
1.

Unsafe Acts: those performed by the operator

2.

Preconditions for Unsafe Acts: environmental
factors contributing to the error

3.

Supervision: management actions affecting the
operator

4.

Organizational Influences: culture, policies, or
procedures of the organization that affect the
operator.

Dr. Reasons describes some nonconformities as “errors”
and others as “violations,” distinct from errors in that they
are “intentional departure[s] from accepted practice.”
Violations may be:
1.

Routine violation: habitual, repeat departures,
enabled by “bending of the rules.”

2.

Exceptional violation: a willful departure outside
norms, not condoned by management.

A structure for categorizing different causes of many
common unintentional or intentional nonconformities
follows.

ISO 17025, Section 4.12.” 4.12.1 Needed improvements and potential sources of nonconformities, either technical or concerning the management system, shall be
identified. When improvement opportunities are identified or if preventive action is required, action plans shall be developed, implemented and monitored to reduce
the likelihood of the occurrence of such nonconformities and to take advantage of the opportunities for improvement.

4

5

Rinciman WB, Merry AF, Error, blame, and the law in health care – an antipodean perspective. Ann Intern Med. 2003 Jun 17; 138(12):974-9.
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Figure 1. Types of Unsafe Acts.

Figure 2. Causes of Preconditions for
Unsafe Acts.
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Figure 3. Causes for Nonconformities of Supervision.
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Figure 4. Causes of Undue Organizations
Influences.

o

The number of participants conducting
the RCA can vary depending on the
nature of the nonconformity. For more
substantial nonconformities, RCAs
often work best when performed by
multidisciplinary teams, from all levels of
staff, with fundamental knowledge of the
specific area involved.

o

The team should have people who were
not involved with the specific incident to
ensure objectivity in the review.

o

A facilitator should be appointed who was
not directly implicated in the incident.

Organizational
Influences

Resource
Management

Organizational
Climate

Organizational
Process

How should an RCA be conducted?
It cannot be emphasized enough that RCAs are not
performance evaluations, and their purpose is learning,
not punishment. Accordingly, personnel and discipline
issues should be handled through a separate process
from RCA. In many contexts, including transportation
and healthcare, the activities and output of an RCA are
inadmissible as evidence and excluded from discovery
in litigation to ensure this purity of purpose. The “just
culture” focus of the RCA creates shared accountability:
the system is responsible for providing an environment
that is optimally designed for safe care and staff is
responsible for their choices of behavior and for reporting
system vulnerabilities.6

•

While specific recommendations for the conduct of
RCAs may differ, a few themes emerge from review of
RCAs across industries:
•

6

Construction. RCAs should be performed by
a team. There is a benefit to engaging multiple
perspectives and multidisciplinary personnel
whose backgrounds encompass the various
parts of the technical analysis and management
systems, and reporting process to ensure a
holistic review of factors that contributed to
the nonconformity that might otherwise be
overlooked.

Agrawal, A, Patient Safety: A Case-based Comprehensive Guide, 2014.

•

Investigation. The nonconformity should be
analyzed for its causal factors.
o

Detailed review of the event by the team

o

Identify problems – what went wrong. Is
this a one-time event or a recurring error?

o

Identify Root Causes/Contributing
Factors – why it went wrong. Focus on
objective causes and minimize causation
conclusions that focus solely on blaming
an individual or individuals, rather than
evaluating environmental, organizational,
supervisory, and other factors where
possible

o

Prioritize the factors that contributed to
the nonconformity, evaluating both their
severity and the probability that these
factors will cause harm in the future

o

Develop interventions that conform
with the prioritization and likelihood of
repetition of the various factors

Recommendation. The team should make
specific, prioritized recommendations for
corrective actions that are intended to
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prevent occurrences of similar events. The
recommendations may incorporate input
from primary operators who will be affected
by the recommendations to enhance their
ability to be implemented efficiently. These
recommendations should be made in writing
and stored for future review as needed.
•

Implementation. Implement those corrective
actions, considering the quality of analysis,
the cost of the suggested interventions, and
their likely real-world impact on safety and
reliability.

•

Evaluation. Evaluate the corrective actions and
take subsequent additional action as needed.

•

Professional Standards and a “Just Culture.” A
“Just Culture” is one that balances blame-free
event reviews with the need for professionals,
including FSSP/FSMPs, to be personally
accountable for adherence to reasonable
standards of professional conduct. Typically,
this involves the creation of a separate
disciplinary process, managed outside the
RCA process, in the event that the RCA
uncovers evidence of intentional wrongdoing
by any individual. A sample tool to assess the
necessity of such a parallel disciplinary process
used in a hospital setting is attached.

To preserve the integrity of the RCA as a blame-free
event review, it is important that any disciplinary process
be additional to, and separate from, the RCA, and that
the individual in charge of making determinations about
disciplinary action be informed by, but not reporting to or
involved in, the RCA itself.

Conviction
Review
Units:
A National
Perspective
98

7

Documentation/Implementation of Improvement.
ISO/IEC 17025 4.11.3 and 4.11.4 requires all selected
changes resulting from corrective action investigations be
documented and implemented. In addition, laboratories
are required to monitor the results of the corrective
actions to ensure the effectiveness of the solutions; this
monitoring should similarly be documented.
In the criminal justice context, documentation and
implementation of corrective action should include
the obligation on the part of the panel conducting the
RCA to communicate the nonconformity to individuals
or agencies involved in casework that may have been
affected by the nonconformity.7 This duty extends to
other individuals who may be similarly situated to those
directly affected by the nonconformity that has been
discovered. For example, an RCA could be performed
on a nonconformity regarding the miscalibration of an
instrument used to assess blood tests in a single DUI case.
If an error is discovered, it would lead to an obligation
to identify all others who might be affected by the
miscalibration and inform them about the re-evaluation
of their cases. Not all nonconformities affect casework,
but when they do, it is important to note that the life and
liberty of a human being may be (or may not be) affected.
For this reason, forensic science service providers have a
duty to inform others of the nonconformity, which should
include a new, amended, or supplemental report with
the correct results and an explanation of the initiating
nonconformity distributed to the various parties in a
case. The FSSP/FSMP must work with the proper legal
authority to identify and notify all individuals whose
cases were affected by the nonconformity/error, and
should participate in the suitable remedy as appropriate.

Note that corrective action may correct errors from which inferences of guilt or innocence may be drawn.

Training of Personnel to Conduct RCAs.
Root cause analysis may be the most difficult part
of establishing proper corrective actions following a
nonconformity. By becoming proficient at investigating
and solving problems of nonconformity in their work,
a laboratory will ultimately need to conduct fewer
investigations. But if done inappropriately, a root cause
analysis investigation may lead to the inadvertent blame
of individuals instead of identifying where a work process
has broken down. Such blame will be detrimental to
encouraging participation in the root cause analysis
process.
A study that evaluated an aggregated group of RCAs
in the healthcare setting identified lack of time (55%),
unwilling colleagues (34%) and inter-professional
differences (31%) as the top three barriers to RCAs.8
Each of these barriers can be addressed, at least in part,
by experienced facilitation and support from senior
management within the organization.
Accordingly, a recommendation is made to establish
key individuals within a forensic laboratory to serve
as facilitators of root cause panels. Characteristics of
successful RCA facilitators will likely include, but may
not be limited to:
•

Interested in facilitating and documenting
problems

•

Excellent listening skills

•

Naturally inquisitive

•

Comfortable speaking in front of a group

•

Detail-oriented

•

Relatively calm disposition

•

Good rapport with front-line personnel and
management

Once selected, these individuals should be required to
receive annual specialized training on the topic of root
cause analysis to include practice in running group
facilitations.
When Should an RCA Be Conducted?
ISO 17025 (4.9.2) states, “Where the evaluation indicates
that the nonconforming work could recur or that there is
doubt about the compliance of the laboratory’s operations
with its own policies and procedures, the corrective action
procedures given in 4.11 shall be promptly followed.” ISO
17025 (4.11.2) continues, “The procedure for corrective
action shall start with an investigation to determine
the root cause(s) of the problem.” Properly done, RCAs
include: investigation of facts and circumstances that
caused or contributed to the nonconformity; development
of interventions that should minimize the chance of
future similar nonconformities, implementation of
those interventions, and evaluation of the impact of the
interventions. As such, they should be deployed with an
eye towards the severity and risk of the problem.
Some laboratories, including the FBI Laboratory,
categorize nonconformities in their work product as
Level 1 or Level 2. Level 1 nonconformities are situations
or conditions that directly affect and have a fundamental
impact on the quality of the work product or the integrity
of evidence. Level 2 nonconformities are situations or
conditions that may affect the quality of the work, but
does not, to any significant degree, affect the fundamental
reliability of the work product or the integrity of the
evidence.
Another approach, modeled after that of the Veterans’
Health Administration (VHA), evaluates whether a full
RCA is needed based on the severity of the nonconformity
and the likelihood of its reoccurrence:9

Bowie, Paul, Skinner, J. and de Wet, C. Training health care professionals in root cause analysis: a cross-sectional study of post-training experiences, benefits, and attitudes.
BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:50.

8

9

A “near miss” should be included for RCA review if its score qualifies when viewed as if the event had actually occurred.
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Table 1. Potential RCA Initiation Matrix.
Probability

Severity
Catastrophic

Major

Moderate

Minor

Systemic errors in
procedure that affect
several outcomes or
reported results;
intentional misconduct
or recklessness in
execution of role

Casework or proficiency
test error that affects
outcome or reported result.
Potential problems that may
affect the reliability, accuracy
or performance of a test
procedure or policy; serious
negligence in execution of role.

Clerical nonconformity
affecting result but
corrected during the
review process prior to
reporting; nonconformity
that does not affect outcome
or reported result

Clerical
nonconformity
that does not
affect outcome
or reported
result

Frequent

3

3

2

1

Occasional

3

3

2

1

Uncommon

3

2

1

1

Remote

3

2

1

1

Likely to occur
multiple times in
1 year

May occur several
times in 1-2 years

May happen once in
2-5 years

May happen once
in 5+ years

RCA Required for 3, Recommended for 2, Optional for 1

When an RCA is required or recommended, it should
be conducted both on actual nonconformities and
on nonconformities that could have occurred but for
a fortuitous intervention or timely discovery. Such
interventions are called “near misses,” and they should
be scored in the SAC Matrix as if they were an event
that actually occurred. Such reviews of near misses or
“close calls” are valuable “because they occur much more
frequently than adverse or reviewable sentinel events
and do not require harm to a patient before learning
can occur.”10 Indeed, “the absence of safety, like poor
health, is clearly signaled by near misses, injuries, and
fatalities, which lend themselves to close analysis and
quantification.”11
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It is also important that the RCA process include steps
designed to understand whether or not the error has been
repeated, and if so, the extent of the nonconformities. An
example would be the use of an improper reagent in a
chemical test – appropriate auditing should be conducted
to ensure what other tests, if any, might have been similarly
compromised by the improper reagent. Another example
might be the calibration of lab equipment, which would
likely require a review of all tests conducted between the
dates of the last calibration and the discovery of the error.

10

Bagian, James et al., The Veterans Affairs Root Cause Analysis System in Action. Journal on Quality Improvement, 2002, Vol. 28 No. 10, 531 – 545, at 531.

11

Making Sense of Root Cause Analysis Investigations of Surgery-Related Adverse Events, Cassin, Bryce R., Barach, Paul R., Surg Clin N Am. 92 (2012) 101-115.

Creating a “Safe Harbor” to Encourage Transparency
and Reporting of Error
It has been shown in numerous settings that providing
a “safe” environment – that is, an environment that
encourages and prevents negative use of important quality
and/or reliability information – enhances participation in
RCAs, and thus improves both their frequency and their
substance.
The key characteristics of such a Safe Harbor include:
1. Qualified Immunity for Participants.
a.

An individual should not be disciplined in any
way for participating in a RCA, or offering a
candid and good faith assessment of the role of
others in an incident under review.

b.

In addition, an individual who reports an error
should receive positive consideration from any
disciplinary body if the individual self-reports
an error within a reasonable time after the
incident (e.g., 10 days). Note that this does not
protect the individual from any liability that
may accrue for the individual’s role in the error,
though the FSSP/FSMPs should consider
the positive impact of the self- reported
information in its assessment of any necessary
punishment.

3. Nothing in this safe harbor should be viewed
as limiting the discovery rights of individuals to
information about the underlying facts related to a
nonconformity (i.e., facts or documents pertaining to
the actual nonconformity, as opposed to documents
generated by the RCA process). The purpose of the
safe harbor is merely to ensure that no one is penalized
as a result of his or her participation in a valuable
event review designed to improve the technical
and management system process, the quality of the
laboratory work product, and the fair administration of
justice.

2. Protection from discovery for Notes, Minutes,
Correspondence, and/or Reports generated as part of
an RCA. In order to ensure that the RCA is an event
review only, designed to learn from error and improve
upstream processes, materials generated as part of an
RCA should not, generally speaking, be discoverable in
civil or criminal litigation related to the incident. This is
in keeping with Peer Review Protection Acts that hold
healthcare event reviews as undiscoverable in 46 states
throughout the United States.12

12
To the extent an error justifying a RCA occurs in a criminal case, the defendant may have enhanced rights to learn about the results of the RCA as part of his/her
criminal defense. Such an issue can be managed by the court of relevant jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis, with the information that the Attorney General views the
protection of RCA work product to be an important public interest that does not preclude any discovery sought by the defendant on the underlying facts at issue.
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APPENDIX D.

Additional Writings on
Conviction Review Units
Scheck, Barry. Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need Them, Why They Will Work, and
Models For Creating Them. Cardozo L. Rev. 31:6, 2010, pp. 2215 – 2256.
“Conviction Integrity Units: Vanguard of Criminal Justice Reform,” Center for Prosecutorial Integrity White Paper,
released Dec. 4, 2014
Barkow et al., Center of the Administration of Criminal Law, New York University School of Law, “Establishing
Conviction Integrity Programs in Prosecutors’ Offices”
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Moore, Terri, “Prosecutors Reinvestigate Questionable Evidence: Dallas Establishes a `Conviction Integrity Unit,’”
Criminal Justice, Volume 26, Number 3, Fall 2011
Gross, Samuel, et al., “The National Registry of Exonerations: Exonerations in 2014,” Published January 27, 2015,
available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx.
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Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 Va. L.
Rev. 271 (2013)
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Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 2089 (2010)

•

Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law,
61 Stan. L. Rev. 869 (2009)

•

Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959
(2009).

•

Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. ( June 2006),
cited with approval in Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2532 n.3 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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